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ABSTRACT
This is a study of the controversy surrounding the history of the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor. Since December 7th, 1941, the subject of the Pearl Harbor attack 
has been dealt with by various executive branch and military investigations, a 
Congressional investigation, the media, historians and foreign governments. Despite the 
years of study, the reasons for the success of the attack are still disputed.
The purpose of this study is to examine the various opinions which have formed the 
controversy. It looks at the statements by key administration officials provided in 
diaries, memoirs, writings and testimony to the official investigations. It details the 
specific allegations made by revisionist writers in their attempt to prove that the 
Roosevelt administration was guilty of a conspiracy to allow the Japanese attack to occur. 
It compares these attacks to the official statements and to the interpretations of those 
who challenged the revisionists.
The paper also studies the factors which allowed the controversy to develop, decline 
and revive over the past half century. It looks at how political ambitions, the change in 
the political climate and the release of classified information affected the controversy and 
allowed it to continue for so long. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the 
controversy and various elements of it.
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BATTLE OVER PEARL HARBOR 
The Controversy Surrounding the Japanese Attack, 1941-1994

INTRODUCTION
On the morning of December 7th, 1941 the forces o f imperial Japan launched an attack 
against the United States at Pearl Harbor. The attack devastated the American forces, 
destroying or severely damaging 188 American planes, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 
destroyers and four other vessels. There were also 3,435 American casualties.1 The 
following day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked for and received from Congress a 
Declaration of War against Japan. Within a week Germany declared war on the United 
States, propelling the nation into a global conflict.
As the shock of the attack wore off, people at all levels of American society wondered 
how the attack could have h happened. There were some questions as to how relations 
between the United States and Japan had deteriorated to the point of war. Other 
questions focused on the reasons for the success of the attack. The initial reaction to the 
attack was to blame the Japanese. Americans accused warmongers in Japan of pursuing a 
policy of conquest, deciding on war and planning the treacherous surprise attack. The 
simple view of Pearl Harbor was that the Japanese were guilty.
Had these held, there would never have been a controversy. Although many people 
endeavored to support this view, others repeatedly challenged and revised it over the 
years, resulting in more than a half century of controversy surrounding the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor. Since the days following the bombing, the facts have been shrouded in 
secrecy and censorship, a problem that led to doubts about what really transpired. The 
early challenges grew out of skepticism over Japan's capabilities. Many Americans did not 
believe that the Japanese could have accomplished the feat unless America had deliberately 
ignored warnings and allowed the base to remain unprepared. Some people accused the
2
administration of planning the attack and even claimed that American pilots flew the 
planes. Less radical opinions held that Japan would not risk war with the United States 
unless given no other option, thereby implicating the administration’s foreign policy. As 
time passed critics held the Roosevelt administration responsible, claiming that the 
war could have been prevented by diplomacy and that Roosevelt, wanting war, had 
refused to negotiate seriously in order to provoke a Japanese attack. They also accused 
Roosevelt of withholding information from the Pearl Harbor commanders and allowing the 
Japanese to surprise the fleet in order to get the United States into the war.
Ironically, those who charged that Roosevelt conspired to allow the attack to take 
place claimed that his motive had to do with unifying the nation. Conspiracists charged 
that Roosevelt put the fleet in Pearl Harbor and lured Japan to strike it in order to shock 
the nation into rallying behind the war effort. The disaster did initially rally the nation 
against its enemies, but it also became the most divisive issue of the war, one that would 
long outlast the administration, the war and most of those involved.
After fifty-three years o f official and private investigations, there has never been any 
direct proof that President Franklin Roosevelt was involved in a conspiracy to 
get the United States into World War II. As one writer put it, "The Pearl Harbor record 
ends with no signed confessions."2 Nevertheless, the controversy over 
Roosevelt's culpability in the Pearl Harbor attack has continued. The clash between the 
necessity of secrecy and the desire for truth provided the impetus for the debate.
Political ambitions, struggles for control over the direction of American foreign policy and 
the classification and release of relevant information sustained the Pearl Harbor debate 
and allowed it to become a major part of the history of the second World War. The 
history of the controversy is a tale which reveals both the political effects of withholding 
information in America and the vigorous struggles to discover or manipulate the truth.
4MAGIC
Before going into the development o f the controversy, it is important to understand 
one of the biggest sources of the controversy, Magic. This was the name given to the 
intelligence derived from the decrypted Japanese messages.
American code breakers had been working on deciphering other countries' codes since 
World War I. Primarily, this consisted of intercepting radio traffic and decrypting the 
messages. Under the leadership of Herbert Yardley, the Black Chamber (the name given 
to the codebreaking agency which was funded by both the State Department and Military 
Intelligence) broke the Japanese diplomatic code prior to the Washington Naval 
Conference of 1921-1922. The intelligence gained from the decrypts o f messages sent 
from Japan to their representatives at the conference gave the United States a great 
advantage in the negotiations.3 Although Yardley's group was shut down under the 
Hoover administration, codebreaking continued under the newly formed Signal 
Intelligence Service (SIS) of the U. S. Army. This was led by William F. Friedman and 
concentrated on breaking the Japanese diplomatic codes. The United States Navy had its 
own codebreaking unit called OP-20-G which was originally led by Lt. Lawrence F. 
Safford, who was again in charge at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.4
The Japanese diplomatic code was enciphered using a machine. In order to transmit 
Japanese messages over commercial airwaves the Japanese used kana. This expressed 
the Japanese syllabary in ideographs which represented the Japanese and Chinese sounds. 
These ideographs were then romanized in order to be printed out by western typewriters.5 
The enciphering machine had a typewriter keyboard by which the message was entered in 
kana. Using a system of telephone exchange stepping switches, it enciphered the 
message, which was then printed out by a second typewriter. The value of the machine 
was that it had millions of possible combinations.6
By 1936, the United States was able to read Japanese diplomatic messages on a regular 
basis. However, the Japanese implemented the new code machine in 1939 which
5Friedman named "Purple." Fortunately for the American codebreakers, the Japanese were 
unable to switch to the new machine all at once. For a brief period of time, some 
embassies did not have the new machine, which meant that messages were being sent 
using both the old and new code. Using clues given from the two sets of messages, 
Friedman and his team were able to build their own Purple machine by mid- 
September, 1940.7 The United States could again read the Japanese messages sent to and 
from their embassies and consulates around the world. This gave the United States 
some knowledge of the advice the ambassadors were receiving and the information Tokyo 
was seeking, thus providing a clue to Japanese intentions. America had also broken other 
diplomatic codes and could predict to some degree the location of the Japanese naval 
ships through radio traffic analysis.8
Although the United States could read the Japanese messages, this did not give them 
complete knowledge of Japanese plans. There were certain limitations. Because it 
was the diplomatic code that they had broken, it meant that they could read the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry messages, not the military messages. (The controversy over whether the 
United States had broken the Japanese Naval code prior to Pearl Harbor will be discussed 
in chapter four.) There was also a limited number of machines. By 1941 only eight Purple 
machines had been built; four were in Washington, one was in the Philippines and three 
had been given to the British. The commanders in Hawaii did not have one. The lack of 
machines made it difficult to decrypt the large volume of messages being intercepted.
Other factors included the few people involved in processing the information and the lack 
of people in intelligence who could translate Japanese. The codebreakers were also 
hindered by transmission and translation errors.9
Secrecy played an important role in hampering the use of Magic. The decrypts were 
shown only to a select group of people: the President, the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Chief o f Naval Operations, the Army Chief 
of Staff and a handful of other high ranking army and naval officers. For the first four
6months, Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull were actually denied the information and 
did not begin receiving Magic until January of 1941.10 Because of the value of the 
information, the administration was very careful to keep it secret. In planning actions 
based on information from the decrypts, it was afraid that the Japanese would deduce that 
America had broken the code. The military was particularly wary of sending information 
to Hawaii due to the number of Japanese natives living in the islands.11 Thus, although 
Magic provided important information, it also restricted the actions that could be taken in 
response to the information.
During the war, the government never revealed that it had broken the Japanese codes, 
because it was getting its most valuable intelligence information from its codebreaking 
operations. However, Congress and the press did uncover some hints that the United 
States had been reading Japanese messages before Pearl Harbor. This was what sparked 
the controversy over Pearl Harbor in 1944 and 1945. When the actual decrypts were 
released to Congress after the war, the controversy flourished. Many historians looking at 
the messages insisted that the administration must have known that the Japanese were 
going to attack, and thus began piecing together the conspiracy theories.
The Information
One important piece of information which the U. S. intelligence intercepted was the 
series of messages which later became known as the "bomb plot messages." The correct 
analysis of these messages would have pointed out that Japan was seeking information on 
targets to bomb. On September 14, 1941, Tokyo sent a message to the Japanese 
consulate in Honolulu labeled "strictly secret." It requested the consulate to make reports 
on vessels in Hawaii and commanded that "the waters [of Pearl Harbor] are to be divided 
rightly into sub areas." The dispatch stipulated that Tokyo's need for information on 
warships and aircraft carriers "at anchor, tied up at wharfs, buoys and in docks" and
7stressed the importance of types and classes of the ships.12 On November 15th, Tokyo 
sent another message which said:
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make 
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice per week.
Although you are already no doubt aware, please take extra care 
to maintain secrecy.13
Three days later the Japanese consulate transmitted information to Tokyo describing 
which ships were in each sub area. It also provided facts on destroyers entering the 
harbor, including the course and speed of the ships. On November 29th, Tokyo further 
requested that the consulate report even when there were no ship movements.14 Other 
more detailed messages were intercepted but not translated until after December 7th.
Although many who studied the messages after the war claimed that they provided 
direct evidence of Japanese intentions on Pearl Harbor, it may not have been so clear. 
There were also numerous messages asking for information concerning American ships in 
the Philippines, Panama, the Far East and in the United States.
Another series of dispatches that hinted at future conflict dealt with a deadline for 
diplomatic action. In the fall of 1941, Japanese and American diplomats attempted to 
reach an agreement between the two countries which would prevent war. The 
negotiations were unsuccessful. However, while they were still going on, there were a 
number of messages sent from Tokyo to Washington, using the Purple code, that urged 
the diplomats in Washington to move quickly. On November 5, the Japanese government 
told its ambassador in Washington that "it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for 
the signing of this agreement are to be completed by the 25th of this month."15 Six days 
later the 25th was confirmed as a "definite deadline." The message also noted that 
America seemed "still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation 
here."16
Probably the most poignant message in this series was sent from Tokyo on November 
22. It said:
8
There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle 
Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or 
four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans, if the 
signing can be completed by the 29th ... we have decided to wait until that 
date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be 
changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.17
After this message, the situation began to decline rapidly. On November 28th, Tokyo 
sent a message praising the "superhuman effort" of the ambassadors and calling the U. S. 
proposal "humiliating." Although Tokyo conceded that negotiations were to end in a few 
days, it asked the diplomats to keep up the appearance of negotiation.18 Two days later, 
Japan warned its embassy in Berlin that war could "break out between the Anglo-Saxon 
Nations and Japan ... quicker than anyone dreams."19 On December first and second, 
messages were sent to embassies in many countries to destroy the code machines and 
secret documents.20
The most important intercepted dispatch was the fourteen part message sent from 
Tokyo to Washington on December 6th, 1941. As previously mentioned, negotiations 
were going on between both countries. In November, the Japanese had made a proposal. 
The Americans had made a counter proposal on November 26 that Japan had seen as an 
ultimatum. The fourteen part message was in response to that proposal. The 
ambassadors were to give this response to the Secretary of State. Translated in 
Washington on the sixth, the first thirteen parts certainly pointed to a deterioration in 
relations between the two countries. The communique began by defending the Japanese 
policies and interests in China. It outlined the steps taken to reach an accord with the 
United States proclaiming Japan's "attitude of fairness and moderation." Tokyo listed a 
series of charges against America including: "seeking for the extension of the war," 
wanting to "maintain ... its dominant position in China and the Far East" and making "a 
proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the 
Japanese Government."21 Roosevelt received the translation of the message from the 
American intelligence staff on December 6th. Roosevelt's confidant, Harry Hopkins, was
9with the President at the time. According to the officer who delivered the message, after 
reading the translation, Roosevelt told Hopkins, "This means war."22 Thus, on eve of 
the attack, the U. S. had some evidence that war was about to break out.
The following morning the last part of the message was translated. It stated:
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American 
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it 
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through 
further negotiations.23
Following this came another message directing the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the 
Secretary of State at exactly 1:00 P.M. on the seventh of December, Washington time.
The next message thanked the ambassadors for their efforts and prayed for their health.24 
Thus, during the morning of December 7th, 1941, American leaders knew that Japan had 
decided to break diplomatic relations at a specific time: 1:00 P.M. of that day.
There were other pieces of information, as well as specific actions or lack of actions, 
that contributed to the controversy and they will be discussed later in the paper. However, 
the Magic information made the most significant contribution to the controversy, first 
because the messages could not be made public and later because they were made 
public and interpreted with the benefit of hindsight by those who doubted the honesty and 
motives of the administration.
CHAPTER I 
POLITICS AND SECRETS
Although the Congressional Investigating Committee, which revealed the controversial 
Magic decrypts, did not meet until after the war, the controversy itself began in the 
immediate aftermath o f the attack on Pearl Harbor. One of the key factors contributing to 
the dissension during the war years was politics. Republicans and other opponents o f 
President Roosevelt criticized his administration for the disaster and continued to search 
for information which would demonstrate his culpability. In Congress, Republicans 
persisted in attacking the explanations provided by the executive branch and charged it 
with not revealing all the facts. To some extent this was unfair to the administration, 
because in the interests o f national security, it could not reveal that it had broken the 
Japanese code. However, it is difficult to determine where the interests of national 
security ended and the desire to conceal mistakes began. Despite the motive, the result 
was the same. Lack of information allowed critics of the administration to make serious 
allegations which went unanswered but generated considerable coverage in the press.
The initial reactions to the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor were ones of shock and 
outrage combined with calls for support of the war effort. Many of the news editorials on 
the day after the attack were jingoistic accounts praising the efforts of Roosevelt and 
calling for all efforts to meet the enemy. Some called for silencing the voice o f disunity, 
and one promoted striking "with all our might to protect and preserve the American 
freedom that we hold dear."1 Even some o f the isolationists urged an attack on Japan.
The America First Committee and labor leaders called for complete support for the war 
effort. House Republican leader, Joseph Martin, declared that party lines were out for the
10
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rest of the war.2 Although there was generally a flood of support for the President, the 
seeds of controversy could be detected in the early hours o f the war. One source of 
criticism was the isolationist movement. Contrary to later years, American isolationism in 
1941 was a strong political trend. A very significant portion o f the population believed 
that American prosperity was contingent on America remaining isolated from the affairs 
and conflicts o f the European and Asian nations. Led by individuals such as Senator 
Gerald Nye and Robert McCormick, the publisher of The Chicago Tribune, the 
isolationists were a very vocal political force. Many were members o f the Republican 
party who not only resisted interventionism but also resented Roosevelt's domestic 
reforms. In the years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the isolationists had successfully 
hampered Roosevelt's intention to assist the British and resist the Germans. However, the 
Japanese attack effectively eroded the influence of the isolationists and thus exacerbated 
their suspicions o f the event.
Senator Gerald Nye, one of the leading isolationists, received word o f the attack 
minutes before he was to address an isolationist crowd in Pittsburgh. Remarking, "It 
sounds fishy to me", Nye went on with his anti-war speech. Later he made charges 
against both the President and the British for maneuvering the United States into the war.3 
Montana representative Jeannette Rankin, the sole dissenter in the vote for the Declaration 
o f War, was overheard muttering, "This might be a Roosevelt trick. How do we know 
Pearl Harbor has been bombed?" John Flynn and Charles Lindbergh refused to comment.4
Once the anger over the attack had begun to subside, most people were perplexed as to 
how it could have occurred. Many refused to believe that the Japanese were capable of 
succeeding at such a complicated endeavor. The Chicago Tribune spread a rumor that 
German pilots had flown the planes and that many of the planes had swastikas.5 Another 
popular belief was that the American officers had all been drunk the night before.6 
Congress and the press also speculated on the attack. Some may have just wanted to
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know why it happened, while others were probably intent on causing problems for the 
administration.7
One factor which facilitated speculation both during the war and in the decades since 
was the withholding of information by the government. This began in 1941 with the 
dearth of information released by the White House. Although Secretary of Navy, Frank 
Knox, had left for Hawaii on December 10th and returned to D. C. on the fourteenth, the 
government was not releasing many facts. The first reports said that the U. S. had lost 
only one battleship, three destroyers and a target ship, the Utah. Tokyo radio claimed 
that the damage was more severe. Although most Americans believed the Japanese claims 
to be mere propaganda, Japan was closer to the truth.8 Knox feared that if the American 
people knew the extent of the damage, "they would panic and the war would be over 
before we get into it."9 Other officials advised the President that it would be a mistake to 
publicize the details as that would let the Japanese know how badly the fleet had been 
hurt.10 Thus, even from the beginning the government felt it had to hide information from 
the public in the interests of national security. A poll taken in January, 1942 revealed that 
61% of Americans thought that important information was being concealed. However, in 
a separate 1942 poll, taken after the details of the damage were revealed, 73% of those 
polled agreed with the navy for withholding the information.11 Nevertheless, at the time 
the lack of detailed impelled people to question and to suspect the official account.
On December 17th, 1941 the President announced the members of a five man 
commission set up to investigate the attack. Justice Owen Roberts, who had been the 
special prosecutor in the Tea Pot Dome Scandal, was selected to lead the commission, 
which also included two generals and two admirals.12 This group limited its 
investigations primarily to what had happened in Hawaii. It concluded that Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short, the ranking military officers in Hawaii, 
were guilty of dereliction of duty. The Commission said that Kimmel and Short were
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notified in dispatches from Washington of the danger of the situation in the weeks prior to 
attack. Kimmel and Short were found guilty o f failure to take the steps necessary to 
meet that situation. The top officials in Washington were held blameless.15
As far as the administration was concerned, the Roberts Commission should have 
ended the clamor over Pearl Harbor; instead it caused more disputes. The Republicans in 
Congress called for more investigations, asserting that the Roberts Commission was 
covering up for the administration and using Kimmel and Short as scapegoats. They 
blamed Washington for not giving sufficient warnings to Hawaii.14 Members o f the 
press also called for further investigations. Owen Villard, writing in Current History, 
wanted the government to provide more information on unified commands, why the War 
Department did not react when General Short implemented an alert for sabotage as 
opposed to one for air attack and why the messages to Hawaii had been so vague.15 The 
New York Times blamed Washington for failing to ensure cooperation among the 
commands and criticized the American public for its prewar attitude.16
The administration was not completely satisfied with the report either. Writing in his 
diary, Secretary of War Henry Stimson criticized the report for not getting to the real 
truth of what happened. Stimson wrote that the primary mistake was in not learning the 
"lessons of the development of the airplane in respect to the defense of a navy and a 
naval base,"17 Roosevelt added to the uproar by suggesting that Kimmel and Short would 
not be court-martialed. The Roberts Commission had singled those two out for 
responsibility, and Congress wanted blood. This raised doubts about whether or not the 
administration was telling the truth.18 O f course, the administration was not telling 
the whole truth. The Roberts Commission Report made no mention of Magic. In fact, the 
commission was denied access to Magic, given only some of the information derived from 
the codebreaking activities and not informed that the Pacific commanders had lacked much 
of the information that the leaders in Washington had held from them.19 The
14
administration hoped the issue would fade, realizing a court-martial would only reveal 
information about its codebreaking activities.
The debate did cool for a while in 1942 and 1943, although there were two 
publications that stirred criticism. The first of these was, How War Came the American 
White Paper: From the Fall o f France to Pearl Harbor by Forest Davis and Ernest K. 
Lindley. Although the authors intended to support the administration and the official 
thesis on the war origins, they revealed certain information concerning the prewar actions 
of the administration which led to criticism. In particular the references to the strength of 
prewar Anglo- American ties as well as administration considerations of a possible 
Japanese attack. The authors wrote that the administration was perplexed as to how to 
get the United States into the war without a direct Japanese attack. Davis and Lindley 
intended to set up an argument that would condemn the isolationists for hampering 
American prewar planning. However, the comments about relations with Japan reinforced 
the isolationist attack on the administration's motives and actions.20
Further fuel for the isolationist fire came in the State Department's own version of the 
actions taken prior to Pearl Harbor. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy,
1931- 1941 was released to the public on January 2, 1943. Previously, the accepted notion 
was that the U. S. had been surprised by the attack, because at the time it was conducting 
negotiations aimed at maintaining peace. The State Department report revealed that as 
early as November 29 Secretary of State Hull thought that diplomacy had failed and 
the situation had become the responsibility of the army and navy. He had also warned of 
the possibility o f a surprise attack. The critics wondered how the administration could 
have been surprised having been alert to the gravity of the situation.21
The influence of politics increased as the debate shifted back to Congress in the fall of 
1943. Martin Melosi in The Shadow o f Pearl Harbor attributed this at least partly to the 
election of 1942 in which the Republicans gained a number of seats in both the House and 
Senate. The context of the debate was the expiration of the Statute of Limitations for
15
prosecuting Kimmel and Short, which was to occur on December 7th, 1943. The 
administration did not want a trial for fear that it would interfere with the war effort. The 
two main problems with a trial were that it would require testimony from officials who 
were busy fighting the war and that it might reveal information about Magic.22 The 
military decided to waive the Statute of limitations and promised to proceed with the trial 
at the earliest appropriate time 23
In early December, Congress decided to interfere. Some Congressmen called for the 
immediate trial of the Hawaiian commanders. Others openly questioned why the officers 
were not free to tell their story. Rather than accepting the administration's excuse, many 
critics believed that the administration was trying to hide something or protect someone.
In the end, Congress passed a resolution extending the statute o f limitations for another 
six months, to June 7, 1944 24
By May o f 1944, with the deadline for a trial looming, neither Kimmel nor Short had 
yet been brought to trial and the allegations resumed. Kimmel himself was asking for 
an open court-martial, which he believed would vindicate him. Arthur Krock, a New York 
Times columnist, exacerbated the situation in a May 31 article in which he raised a number 
of questions which he claimed the administration had never properly answered. He 
questioned why the fleet had been placed in Hawaii instead of California, why it was in the 
harbor during a crisis, why Washington had not ordered Short to implement the correct 
type of alert and why the military had not responded to the intelligence supplied by the 
State Department.25
Congress decided to extend the statute o f limitations for Pearl Harbor trials for another 
six months and directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy to conduct 
investigations into what happened. Partisan politics certainly influenced the debate over 
the resolution. Some Representatives called for war unity and accused the Republicans o f 
trying to undermine the war effort. Hamilton Fish, a New York Republican, defended his 
party from these attacks and charged the administration with postponing the trial for fear
16
that it would uncover evidence pointing to the culpability of administration officials.26 In 
the Senate, Homer Ferguson (Republican, Michigan) claimed that the facts had not all 
been available at the time of the Roberts Commission. Senator Hendrick Shipstead 
(Republican, Minnesota) stirred even more commotion by bringing up references to 
prewar communications and promises between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.27
The Election of 1944
The political influence on the Pearl Harbor controversy was best illustrated by the 
actions of both parties in relation to the Presidential election of 1944. The Republicans 
faced a difficult prospect in trying to defeat an incumbent in the middle of a war. There 
was no way to avoid the war in the campaign, since it was the overwhelming issue in 
America. The problem for the Republicans was that America was winning the war, and 
they had to be careful not to appear disloyal or unpatriotic in opposing Roosevelt's 
policies. Their aim was to convince the American public that they offered a better foreign 
policy plan as well as a better domestic policy. However, most Americans were satisfied 
with the administration's handling of the war.
The Republicans needed an issue that would make Roosevelt look weak on foreign 
policy; Pearl Harbor became that issue. The Republicans developed a strategy based on 
attacking the President for how he got the United States into the war, hoping to show that 
he had made major mistakes.28 Republican Congressmen found ammunition for their 
attack in the summer of 1944 while serving on military and naval affairs committees where 
some of the Pearl Harbor secrets were revealed. Word leaked out that if the hidden facts 
were known, they would portray a very different view of Roosevelt's handling of foreign 
policy.29
Although Pearl Harbor did become a campaign issue, ironically it was not the 
Republicans who originally raised it. Missouri Senator and Democratic Vice-Presidential 
nominee, Harry Truman, addressed the issue in an article he wrote for Collier's in the
17
summer of 1944. Truman blamed the Pearl Harbor disaster on the lack of cooperation 
between the army and navy and hinted that the fault lay specifically with the lack of 
cooperation between Kimmel and Short. Kimmel responded to Truman in a letter that 
was entered into the Congressional Record on August 21st, 1944. He wrote:
The real story of the Pearl Harbor attack and the events preceding it has 
never been publicly told. . . For more than two and a half years I have been 
anxious to have the American people know all the facts.30
Truman attacked back, declaring that everything he wrote in his report was true and 
that a court-martial would prove it.31 Truman intended to defend the administration, but 
instead allowed the Republicans an opening to exploit the issue.
Congress was once again the arena for the dispute. Republican Ralph Church (Illinois) 
claimed that the full story would "shock the world," that Washington was guilty and the 
report o f the Roberts Commission was a political document.32 On August 25th, 
Republican Representative Warren G. Magnuson (Washington) gave information about 
rumors he had heard were spreading on the west coast. According to the rumors, the 
Japanese had made a deal with the United States so that the latter would stop naval and 
aerial patrols in the Central Pacific in the fall of 1941. Magnuson blamed the State 
Department for accepting the Japanese proposal and "bottling up the fleet in Pearl 
Harbor." The State Department denied the rumor on the following day.33
On August 30th, Clarence B. Kellard, a member o f the Republican National 
Committee, blamed the disaster on Roosevelt. He asserted that the President's mistakes 
had led to a longer war and more deaths. He urged people to vote for Republican 
candidate, Thomas E. Dewey, to put foreign policy making authority into the hands of "a 
courageous President belonging to the party which alone has announced a coherent 
foreign policy and post-war plan."34
House Republicans continued the attack, accusing Roosevelt of withholding the real 
story for political reasons. They claimed they were pressing the issue in order to allow the
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public to accurately judge the ability of the President to maintain peace and prevent war. 
Representative Francis Case of South Dakota summed up the Republican motive for 
making the disaster a political issue. Case claimed that the public needed the real story, 
because if the President was re-elected, it would be on the understanding that only he 
could manage the war and make the peace.35 The Republicans wanted the American 
people to see that he could not.
In the Senate, Republicans Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania) and Forest Harness (Indiana) 
brought new charges against the administration. They announced that the Australians had 
warned Washington seventy-two hours before the attack that a Japanese fleet was heading 
toward Hawaii. Republican Representative Church added to the attack by reading a letter 
from a Mr. Sydney Graves, a resident of Washington. Graves said he had overheard the 
Australian Foreign Minister, Sir Owen Dixon, remark at a party that his country had 
picked up the Japanese fleet heading toward America and had warned America. Sir Owen 
Dixon denied the claim.36 House Majority leader, Democrat John McCormack of 
Massachusetts denied the Australian rumor and claimed that the Republicans were just 
trying to erode the public's confidence in the President. The Australian Prime Minister, 
John Curtin termed the rumors "pure invention."37 Roosevelt tried to dismiss the claims, 
saying that anyone who had information should present it to the army and navy 
investigators. He also said, "Lots of stories of that sort would be heard morning, noon 
and night until November 7th (election day)."38
The Republican candidate, New York Governor Thomas Dewey, also brought up the 
issue in September, 1944 but abruptly and somewhat mysteriously did not continue. The 
story behind his actions is a clear example o f politics and secrecy becoming entangled. 
General George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, heard that Dewey had learned about 
the breaking of the diplomatic code and was planning to reveal it during the campaign. 
Marshall conferred with Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations and 
decided to send a letter to Dewey. Marshall knew that the United States was still
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gathering important information from the diplomatic messages and wanted to preserve 
that source from becoming a political casualty.39
Marshall sent Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke to meet with Governor Dewey in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma on September 26. He delivered a letter from Marshall to Dewey that 
was marked "top secret." Dewey read the first two paragraphs which warned him of the 
secrecy involved in the rest of the letter. After questioning Clarke, he decided not to read 
further, refusing to "seal his lips on things he already knew about Pearl Harbor" or might 
find out later.40 Dewey claimed he knew all about America's reading o f certain codes 
before the war and stated that Roosevelt "ought to be impeached" for knowing what was 
happening before the attack and not preventing it. He gave the letter back to Clarke but 
offered to meet with him in Albany the following week.41
Marshall sent Clarke to Albany to meet with Dewey on the 28th with a new letter. 
Governor Dewey only agreed to read the letter if he could show it to his advisor, Mr. 
Elliott Bell, and keep the letter in his safe. He also claimed that he did not understand why 
it was so secret since "This code business is the worst kept secret in Washington."42 
Dewey could not believe that the Japanese had not changed their codes. However, he did 
telephone Marshall, and Marshall agreed to allow Dewey to show the letter to Bell and 
keep it in his safe.
Both Dewey and Bell read the letter and asked Clarke a number of questions. 
According to Clarke, Dewey mentioned that he did not realize that the Japanese were still 
using the codes mentioned in the letter 43 Marshall’s letter reported how they were still 
obtaining information from the diplomatic code about enemy activities in both the Pacific 
and Europe. America's best information about German activities was coming from the 
intercepted messages sent by the Japanese ambassador in Berlin. Marshall also explained 
how revealing the codebreaking activities would threaten relations with America's allies 
who were very wary of sharing secrets with America.44 Clarke testified that after he had
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answered a number o f questions, Dewey commented, "I suppose that may be the real 
reason for taking no action on the Pearl Harbor warnings they had — they could not 
interpret the warnings."45
The important point about this episode between Marshall and Dewey is that it defended 
the administration's secrecy in regards to Pearl Harbor. After discovering what the 
administration knew, Dewey still refrained from raising the issue. Of course, the governor 
probably also realized that revealing the secrets could backfire on him. At a time when 
the war was going well, he may have appeared unpatriotic or worse if the revelations 
proved detrimental to the war effort. Without exposing the information, he had to retreat 
from using the Pearl Harbor issue in the campaign.46 After the election, The New York 
Times reported that Dewey had received special information during the campaign but did 
not reveal it due to its importance to the war effort47
The Army and Navy Investigations
The investigations which Congress had called for in June of 1944 continued their work 
into the fall, the Naval Court of Inquiry finishing its examinations on September 27 and the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board finishing on October 6. The results were not announced until 
December, which provoked some charges that damaging information was being kept 
secret until after the election.48 Even in December, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson 
and Secretary o f the Navy James Forrestal refused to release the full reports, claiming that 
publication would impede the war effort. However, they did announce that Kimmel and 
Short had been cleared of most o f the accusations, and neither would have to face a 
court-martial.49
Only after the war were the reports released, although without revealing any references 
to Magic. The two investigations contradicted the Roberts Commission. The Army 
Board blamed the Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, for failing to fulfill his duty to 
keep Short fully aware of the severity of the situation. It also criticized Marshall for
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not keeping Short informed of what precautions were necessary. Short had been taking 
actions to prevent sabotage instead o f aerial attack, but Marshall had never commanded 
Short to do otherwise. The Naval Court of Inquiry cleared Admiral Kimmel of blame. 
Instead, it found that the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, was guilty of 
failure to transmit the vital information pertaining to the break with Japan.50
Around the same time the results of two other investigations were being revealed. The 
Hewitt Inquiry and the Clausen Investigation reversed the blame back to the base 
commanders, citing KImmel and Short for failure of judgement. The Hewitt Inquiry was 
established by Secretary Forrestal in 1945, because he felt that previous investigations had 
not uncovered everything. Admiral H. Kent Hewitt led this investigation which 
exonerated General Marshall, approving his efforts in the weeks prior to December 7 and 
finding Short guilty of not acting on the information received. The Hewitt Inquiry 
stressed the limitations on the intelligence information which the government received 
from decoded diplomatic dispatches of the enemy. The Clausen Investigation was 
conducted by Major Henry Clausen. On Stimson’s orders, Clausen traveled around the 
world to further investigate the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Clausen 
took affidavits from 92 people and came to the same general conclusions as the Hewitt 
Inquiry had.51
The Congressional Investigation
By the fall of 1945, the American people did not know whom to blame for the debacle. 
A poll found that more people (17%) thought the government was responsible than 
accused Kimmel and Short (10%), but opinions varied. A majority (55%) of those polled 
thought that Congress should investigate the matter further.52 Congress formed the Joint 
Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Comprised of 
six Democrats and four Republicans, this Committee met from November 15, 1945 to
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May 31, 1946. In addition to the findings of the previous investigations, the Joint 
Committee examined forty-three witnesses and took thousands of pages of testimony.53
On November 12th, Time predicted the Congressional inquiry would be "shot through 
with politics — on both sides."54 The prediction proved correct. Republicans and 
Democrats badgered witnesses in the effort to uncover information which would either 
prove Roosevelt's guilt or exonerate him. After seven days of questioning General 
Marshall, William D. Mitchell, counsel for the Committee, announced that he and his 
assistants were quitting since the work was going to drag long past the deadline which 
Congress had set. Time reported that Senator Homer Ferguson, "still looking for evidence 
that Franklin Roosevelt had war- mongered, took up nine and a half hours of Marshall's 
time."55 In the end the Committee split over its conclusions. Six Democrats as well as 
the Republican Representatives, Beartrand Gearhart and Frank B. Keefe, formed the 
Majority opinion while Republican Senators Owen Brewster and Homer Ferguson 
dissented and published separate conclusions.
The Majority concluded that Japan deserved most of the blame for the attack, 
condemning Japan's aggressive policy, duplicity and treacherous actions. It exonerated 
the diplomatic actions of the United States and found no justification in those actions for 
Japan to attack. The majority actually praised Roosevelt for making every effort to avert 
war. They blamed the Army and Navy for not being prepared, charging Kimmel and Short 
with making errors in judgement by not noting the significance of the information which 
they had received. The War Department was held accountable for its failure to correctly 
interpret the intelligence it had and take decisive action within time.56
The critics of the administration remained highly skeptical of the Congressional 
investigation and the Majority Report of the Joint Committee. One critic, Admiral Robert 
Theobald claimed that the Democrats in Congress were part of the effort to cover up the 
involvement of President Roosevelt. He stated:
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There can be no doubt that many members of Congress knew or strongly 
suspected that the full Pearl Harbor story would intimately involve the 
Nation's Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt. The Democratic 
majority on the Joint Committee recognized that this would have a strongly 
adverse effect upon their party's future fortunes. Consequently, their 
strategy was to bury the true Pearl Harbor story under a mass of 
evidence that would forever preserve its secret.57
Theobald and others accused the Democrats of failing to press the key witnesses to clarify
statements.
In opposition to the majority opinion, the Minority Report was very critical of the 
administration. This report stated the views of Senators Ferguson and Brewster who 
charged the President with knowing that war was imminent and waiting for the enemy to 
fire the first shot. Furthermore, they found that the President had intelligence information 
disclosing Japanese war intentions and felt that the President and his advisors should have 
foreseen that the target was Hawaii. They criticized the President for not ensuring that 
American commanders in Hawaii were properly warned of and supplied for an attack by 
Japan. They also denounced Roosevelt for not informing Congress and the American 
people of the dangers that the nation faced.58
Due to political divisions, the Congressional Investigation did not provide the definitive 
answers to the questions surrounding Pearl Harbor. The Republicans were successful in 
illuminating certain administration failures and revealing more about Roosevelt's foreign 
policies. However, neither side obtained everything it wanted. The Republicans could not 
place all the blame on Roosevelt and his policies, but the Democrats could not thwart 
doubts about the actions of the administration. Although Senator Brewster threatened a 
second investigation if the Republicans gained control of Congress in 1946, this never 
materialized.59
Congress had reached its conclusions; however, the controversy was not settled. The 
Joint Committee assured the continuation of the debate by publishing the hearings and its
24
findings. The multiple volumes of information included reports of the previous 
investigations, testimony of key witnesses and important documents. Also contained in 
this were the transcripts o f the secret Japanese messages which the American government 
had intercepted and decoded prior to the attack. This information, covert for so long, had 
finally been revealed, but the information was not completely clear. Various 
interpretations of the evidence, particularly the Magic decrypts and testimony of key 
officials, spurred a long series of private inquiries which extended the controversy long 
after the war. Instead of laying to rest all the suspicions and doubt which had developed 
in the years of political attacks and unaswered questions, the information revealed by the 
Congressional investigation gave sustenance to these suspicions.
CHAPTER H 
HOW TO REM EM BER PEARL HARBOR
As the Pearl Harbor controversy moved from Congress to the historians, the nature of 
the investigation transformed from a politically motivated attempt to assess blame to a 
wider debate over America's foreign policy. The debate over the attack on Pearl Harbor 
continued, because people on both sides of the issue saw the political utility of convincing 
others that their interpretation was correct. Added to this were the details, made public 
during the Congressional investigation, which provided enough evidence for skeptical 
minds to suspect a conspiracy.
Senators Ferguson and Brewster criticized President Roosevelt for his failures; 
however, in the decade after the war the critics were adamant in their conviction that 
Roosevelt had not failed. Revisionists, such as Henry Elmer Barnes, Charles Beard, 
George Morgenstem, Percy Greaves and Charles Tansill as well as Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel and Robert Theobald, charged that Roosevelt understood the nature of the 
Japanese threat and knew that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor. Rather than accusing 
him of failure to take the proper steps necessary for adequate preparation, they claimed he 
deliberately withheld information from the base commanders and the American people in 
order to ensure that the Japanese did attack. According to the conspiracy theorists, 
Roosevelt had one main purpose; he wanted the United States to join in the war against 
the axis powers but only with the full support of the American people. They claimed that 
Roosevelt could only guarantee American support if the enemy successfully attacked the 
United States.
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This theory gained popularity in the decade after the war due to the efforts of two 
groups: the revisionist historians and the defenders of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, who 
had been the Commander of the Pacific Fleet at the time of attack and received most of 
the initial blame. The first of these groups held a more extensive goal, that of reversing 
the trend toward interventionism in American foreign policy.
In his book, Roosevelt, Munich to Pearl Harbor, published in 1950, historian Basil 
Rauch claimed that the chief lesson Roosevelt learned from Pearl Harbor was "the lesson 
of internationalism."1 This idea lay at the core of the imbroglio. America had turned to an 
interventionist, global foreign policy which included alliances, the United Nations, the 
Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the Korean War. However, in the forties and 
fifties not everyone agreed with this policy and many were not willing to allow its 
continuation without protest. Barnes and Beard had been isolationists before the war and 
had maintained their views throughout the war. They and other revisionists challenged 
interventionism and what they deemed were the lies created by the "court historians" to 
justify it.
One great obstacle the revisionists faced was the increasingly popular belief that 
America's entry into the war had been for the best, an event that saved the world and made 
America great. The isolationist movement was far less significant in the post war period 
than it had been before the war. Post-war popular opinion dismissed the isolationist 
notion that America could have avoided the war and held that America lacked any choice 
other than war in 1941. Americans praised Roosevelt for his farsightedness that had 
prepared America for the war and the leadership which ensured a victory. It was popular 
to believe that the U.S. had preserved humanity and strengthened the United States. The 
revisionists called this "court history" and felt that the correct interpretation of the Pearl 
Harbor episode would be vital to the removal of this paradigm.
The revisionists, rather than accepting and praising America's involvement in the war, 
insisted that America could have remained isolated from the conflict. They emphasized
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that neutrality would have resulted in a stronger America and a better world situation than 
America's intervention had caused. Barnes claimed that "the rise of Communism, military 
state capitalism, the police state, the impending doom of civilization" were all the results 
of U. S. "meddling abroad in situations which did not materially affect our security or 
prestige."2 Weighing the results against the deaths, the wounded, the missing and the 
billions of dollars spent on the war, Barnes concluded that America would have been 
better off if it had "remained aloof."3 Supporting their belief that war could and should 
have been avoided, the revisionists attacked Roosevelt and his administration for taking 
actions that led America into the war. In their eyes Pearl Harbor was only the culmination 
o f Roosevelt's covert efforts to involve the United States in foreign wars. Examining the 
volumes of information about Pearl Harbor, the revisionists saw an opportunity to reveal 
Roosevelt's duplicity and with that convince America that wars and interventionist policies 
were avoidable.
In the decade after the war, there were a number of writers who sought to rewrite the 
history of Pearl Harbor and the years before it. George Morgenstem who had contributed 
to many of the isolationist editorials of the Chicago Tribune authored Pearl Harbor: The 
Story o f the Secret War, which was published in 1947. He accused Roosevelt of working 
to precipitate a war with Japan as a means of entering the war against Germany.4 Charles 
Beard followed a year later with President Roosevelt and the Coming o f the War, 1941. 
Beard compared the stated policies of the Roosevelt administration with what he 
considered to be the reality, that Roosevelt was actually pushing Japan into the war.
Beard also detailed the attempts by the administration to cover its actions relating to Pearl 
Harbor. Charles TansilTs Backdoor to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941, 
published in 1952, expanded that attack on the former President's foreign agenda. He 
traced Roosevelt's interventionist efforts as well as what he considered missed 
opportunities reaching back into the early nineteen thirties. The following year, Henry
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Elmer Barnes edited a collection of revisionist essays, entitled Perpetual War fo r  
Perpetual Peace, which explored these same themes.5
These four writers, as well as William Neumann, Percy Greaves and William Henry 
Chamberlain, put forth the basic revisionist judgement of Franklin Roosevelt. They 
argued that national security had not been threatened by the Axis powers but that 
Roosevelt for political and personal ends wanted America involved in the war. According 
to them, Roosevelt moved the country toward war while telling a different story to the 
American people. They claimed that Roosevelt's frustration over failed attempts to incite 
Germany to attack motivated him to provoke Japan in to open a "backdoor" to war with 
Germany. Various publications, most notably the Chicago Tribune, Human Events, 
Freeman and The National Review, endeavored to publicize and support these views.6 
Others, like the American Mercury, which called the attack part of a plot between the 
United States and Russia to carve up the world, stirred the controversy further.7 The 
revisionists provided challenges to the accepted view of American entry into the war. 
However, their conclusions concerning Pearl Harbor, that Roosevelt not only provoked 
the attack but knew it was coming and intended to keep the information hidden to ensure 
that the attack came, were highly controversial.
Two other writers who magnified the dispute by accusing the administration of having 
prior knowledge of the attack were Admirals Husband E. Kimmel and Robert A.
Theobald. Although they challenged the accepted history of the attack, they differed from 
the revisionists by having a far narrower purpose. Instead of attacking the 
interventionist policies, they intended to exonerate Kimmel.
Theobald struck first in 1954 with The Final Secret o f Pearl Harbor: The Washington 
Contribution to the Japanese Attack. Theobald had commanded a flotilla of destroyers in 
December, 1941 and was in Hawaii during the attack. He built his case primarily on 
circumstantial evidence. Describing one failure after another by the military leaders, he 
argued that the only explanation for the withholding of such essential information was that
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Roosevelt had ordered this. He claimed that the President "did not intend that any 
American action should cause them (the Japanese) to change their plans at the last 
minute."8
Kimmel wrote Admiral Kimmel’s Story in 1955 in defense of his actions and in the 
effort to reveal information which had not been made directly available to the public. He 
argued that Washington had information prior to December 7 that identified an attack on 
Pearl Harbor and blamed Washington for not providing this information to him. Kimmel 
asserted that even if the data was provided just two hours before the attack, he could have 
at least been able reduce the damage by having all his planes and guns ready to meet the 
Japanese planes.9 The failure of the usually competent officers of the War and Navy 
Departments to properly command and inform the officers in Hawaii was inexplicable to 
Kimmel. He believed that the lack of action on the part of those officers "must have been 
in accordance with high political direction."10 Kimmel believed Roosevelt's involvement 
was the only explanation for the actions of Marshall and Stark.
Issues
Having established the motive behind those who challenged the official conclusions 
about the attack on Pearl Harbor, it is important to look at the key issues in their challenge 
and the official opinions about those issues. As this paper focuses on the Pearl Harbor 
incident, the debate over Roosevelt's foreign policy, particularly in relation to 
the European countries, will not be covered in detail. This paper examines the matters 
which directly pertain to the attack: whether or not Roosevelt wanted war with Japan, 
including the "ultimatum"; the information that the American government had prior to the 
attack; the war warnings; the actions of the key people in Washington on the sixth and 
seventh of December; as well as the "Winds Messages."
At the core of the revisionist argument was the information provided by Congress in 
the publication of Pearl Harbor Attack, the multiple volumes of testimony and exhibits put
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together by the Joint Committee. The most important data in this was the collection of 
decrypted Japanese messages. The testimonies of those involved were also scrutinized by 
both sides in the debate. Although Roosevelt had died before having a chance to testify, 
there were numerous government officials and military officers who did speak to at least 
one of the investigations, if not to the Joint Committee itself. Key officials who testified 
were General George C. Marshall (Chief of Staff), Admiral Harold Stark (Chief of Naval 
Operations), Cordell Hull (Secretary of State) and Henry Stimson (Secretary of War). 
Other important testimony was given by War Department officials, Colonel Rufus Bratton 
(Chief of Far East Intelligence), Colonel Otis K. Sadtler and Colonel William Friedman, as 
well as Naval Department officials, Commander Laurance Safiford (Chief of Security 
Intelligence Communications) and Lt. Commander Alwin Kramer (Chief Translator). It 
was their statements combined with the Magic reports that fueled the fire of the debate. 
Thus, in addressing each issue the opinions and statements of those involved as well as the 
revisionist interpretation will be explained.
Reasons for War
The first issue that must be addressed if one is to believe the accusations against the 
President is why he would have desired war with Japan. Had he not, then there would 
have been no reason to withhold information and allow the attack to occur. Although 
there was strong evidence showing the administration's desire to join in the war against 
Germany, there was more debate over whether or not he wanted to enter into war against 
Japan. The administration claimed that it had attempted to avoid war with Japan for fear 
o f a two front war. Officials declared that the purpose of the negotiations with Japan had 
been to avert war. Their dilemma was that they neither wanted war nor would they 
appease Japanese demands and abandon China and possibly European colonies to 
Japanese aggression.
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Cordell Hull wrote in his memoirs, published in 1948, that the administration had 
worked for peace in the Pacific. He claimed to have felt it "necessary if they were to make 
an adequate contribution to the defeat of Hitler...."11 In November of 1941, Roosevelt, 
according to Henry Stimson's diary, was trying to stall for an additional six months in 
which to build forces to a level which would deter Japanese aggression and guarantee 
national security.12 General Marshall testified that the administration had wanted to delay 
American involvement until preparations were complete and was hoping to avoid a two 
front war.13 At a secret press conference held before the war, Marshall told reporters, 
"The last thing the U.S. wants is a war with Japan which would divide our strength."14 
Admiral Stark testified that Roosevelt was determined to stop Japanese aggression, that he 
even promised privately to resume trade if Japan ceased its aggression.15
Henry Stimson best communicated the administration's dilemma. He noted in his diary 
on November 27, 1941 that others were hoping to gain more time for preparation. The 
Secretary of War, however, did not want "time at the expense of humility on the part of 
the United States or of reopening the thing which would show a U. S. weakness."16 He 
claimed that America needed to prevent the Japanese from expanding southward as that 
would "encircle U. S. interests in the Philippines and get into vital supplies of rubber in 
Malaysia.17
The conspiracists, convinced that Roosevelt wanted war with Japan, refused to accept 
these statements. They stressed that Roosevelt, wanting to be in the war and unable to 
bait Hitler into attacking, had resorted to war with Japan in order to enter the conflict in 
Europe through the "back door." Morgenstern argued that Roosevelt would do anything 
to involve the United States in the war due to: the failure of his domestic policies, his 
desire to win a place in world history, his commitment to foreign interests, the need to 
tighten his political hold on the country and the pressure asserted by the Army and Navy 
leaders who saw the opportunity for increased glory and status.18
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Admiral Theobald also accused Roosevelt of wanting war with Japan; however, he was 
less critical of the President's motives. Theobald argued that the President, in his role as 
the Commander-in-Chief, was looking at the larger picture of the global war. Roosevelt 
had to get America into the war before Hitler's power increased beyond America's ability 
to combat it. Theobald believed that Roosevelt was willing to sacrifice the lives of the 
men and women at Pearl Harbor as a strategic move. That sacrifice would unite the 
nation behind the war effort which would save lives in the long run.19
Admiral Kimmel claimed that Roosevelt had to get America into the war because of 
the secret commitments he had made to Great Britain. He argued that the President had 
promised Great Britain's Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to support the British if Japan 
invaded either Siam or the Dutch East Indies or attacked the British. Kimmel cited as 
evidence dispatches sent from London that assured British Air Marshall Brook Popham in 
Singapore that the U. S. would support Britain in the case of those actions listed above.20 
Kimmel stated that the Japanese, having knowledge of these commitments, concluded that 
if they were to attack the British or Dutch colonies, then an attack on U. S. forces was 
also necessary.21
Kimmel also directed attention to the comments of Henry Stimson on the necessity of 
having the Japanese fire the first shot. Kimmel took the following two quotes from 
Stimson's diary as evidence:
In spite of the risks involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first 
shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American 
people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the 
ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in any one's mind as to 
who were the aggressors.
and
When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was 
of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way 
which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant 
feeling in spite of the news of catastropheswhich quickly developed.22
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Other evidence that the revisionists presented to demonstrate Roosevelt's war aims 
were speeches by British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. On November 10, 1941 he 
announced that Great Britain would come to the aid of the United States if it was attacked 
by Japan. Theobald reasoned that Churchill would not have made this commitment "with 
the tremendous war burdens his country was then supporting, unless he had his quid pro 
quo,"23 Kimmel noted that in January of 1942 Churchill told Parliament that he had 
received assurances from Roosevelt at the Atlantic Conference that the United States 
would come into the war in the Far East even if they were not attacked.24 Roosevelt had 
promised Churchill to go to war if Britain was attacked, but he had also promised the 
American people to stay out of foreign wars. In the case of Japan only attacking Great 
Britain, Roosevelt would have had to break one of these promises. Thus, the revisionists 
insisted that Roosevelt needed the Japanese to attack the United States if they attacked 
Great Britain.
Morgenstem argued that Roosevelt wanted an attack and accused him of moving the 
Pacific Fleet from its bases in California to Pearl Harbor to invite a Japanese attack. 
Roosevelt claimed that he moved the fleet in order to deter Japanese aggression.
However, Admiral J. O. Richardson, Kimmel's predecessor as Commander of the Pacific 
Fleet, was emphatic in his opposition to the President's order. Richardson claimed that the 
fleet could not act as a deterrent, arguing that the military government of Japan would 
recognize the weakness of the fleet and its lack of readiness.25 The United States could 
not defend the Pacific with the ships that it had nor could it deter Japanese aggression. 
However, as Admiral Theobald pointed out, the Pacific Fleet was a target that Japan 
wanted eliminated in case of war. He accused Roosevelt of keeping the fleet in Hawaii for 
the sole purpose of provoking Japan into an overt act against the United States 26
The revisionists claimed that American diplomacy also provoked Japan to strike. On 
November 25th, 1941 Secretary Hull had proposed offering Japan a "modus vivendi," a
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three month truce during which Japan would stop its aggression and the United States 
would open trade and resume oil shipments "in sufficient quantities for the available 
population."27 Secretary Stimson did not think that the Japanese would accept such a 
drastic proposal, but he did think that the proposal safeguarded American interests by 
committing the Japanese to hold off on any aggressive actions. However, Roosevelt and 
Hull rejected the "modus vivendi" at the last minute and sent a more rigid proposal. 
According to Stimson, the President changed his mind upon hearing of Japanese troop 
movements into Indo-China, which Roosevelt saw as "evidence of bad faith on the part of 
the Japanese. "28
Hull explained that the decision to go with this other proposal was influenced by 
foreign countries. Churchill opposed the "modus vivendi" on the grounds that it left the 
Chinese in a bad position. Hull defended the decision by claiming that the American 
people would have opposed supplying Japan with oil, a resource the Asian nation needed 
to fulfill its war aims. Hull felt that the Japanese would never accept the new proposal but 
claimed he had to "leave no possibility for peace unexplored. "29
The revisionists argued that it was not a peace proposal at all but an ultimatum which 
forced Japan to go to war. Morgenstem pointed out that the "ultimatum" called for 
complete Japanese withdrawal from China and Indo-China, as well as binding them to 
peace in the Pacific and non-intervention in Europe. He charged that these proposals, 
rather than striving for compromise, went far beyond any previous offers in their demands 
for Japanese capitulation. Morgenstem looked at references to post-war comments by 
Shigenori Togo, the Japanese Foreign Minister at the time of the attack. Togo said, "The 
United States had served upon us what we viewed as an ultimatum containing demands far 
in excess of the strongest positions theretofore taken."30 Morgenstem believed that 
Roosevelt understood how the Japanese would view the proposal but still sent it because 
he wanted war.
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Henry Elmer Barnes placed these actions into the argument against interventionism.
He asserted that the United States should have accepted the Japanese terms offered in 
November of 1941, because those terms safeguarded America's interests in the Far East. 
Barnes argued that the U. S. would have gained more from those terms than they 
received through four years of war, without the loss of lives and huge expenditures.
Barnes portrayed Roosevelt as a war hawk and stated, "By November 25th, the United 
States had decided on war with no intention of reaching a diplomatic settlement. "31
Information
Not only did the revisionists indicate that Roosevelt wanted war with Japan, but they 
argued that he knew it was coming. Thus, they continued the wartime debate over how 
much information the administration held before the attack and what the information 
meant. As explained in the introduction, the United States had intercepted a surfeit of 
messages alluding to an attack against it. The nation's civilian and military leaders knew 
that the Japanese had secretly set a deadline of the end of November for diplomatic 
resolution of the situation. The military had intercepted communication between Tokyo 
and the Japanese Consulate in Hawaii requesting frequent information about the location 
of Naval ships in Pearl Harbor. The U. S. government had the Japanese reply to the 
American ten point proposal, knew that the Japanese were going to break off negotiations 
and knew at what time the message was to be delivered.
In addition to this intelligence data, the administration had received warnings of a 
possible attack on Pearl Harbor as early as January, 1941. Admiral Richardson, who was 
the fleet commander in Hawaii at the time, sent a message to Admiral Stark, the Chief of 
Naval Operations. His message warned that he could not put torpedo nets into the 
harbor to protect the ships. Stark, alarmed, wrote back on January 25th that he feared 
that Japan might initiate a war with the United States via a surprise attack on the Fleet or
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Base in Pearl Harbor. He also identified the two greatest dangers as being air bombing 
and air torpedo attacks.32
A few days later the Peruvian Ambassador in Tokyo warned an American official that 
his intelligence sources had discovered a Japanese war plan which included a surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor. American Ambassador, Joseph Grew, sent the warning to 
Washington, where it was not taken very seriously.33
In hindsight, the information pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor. The revisionists 
argued that government had all this information signifying an attack, so they must have 
known about it but kept it secret due to their ulterior motives. Barnes focused particularly 
on the fourteen part reply message. He argued that the U. S. had the decoded 
message, knew what it meant, knew when it would be delivered, knew of Japan’s tendency 
to initiate wars with a surprise attack and thus must have realized the attack was 
coming.34 Morgenstem claimed that the administration knew that the attack would be on 
Pearl Harbor. He contended that if Japan was going to make a move, it could not afford 
to leave the American fleet untouched at Pearl Harbor. Morgenstem also pointed to the 
’’bomb plot messages" as further evidence that the administration knew an attack was 
imminent.35
Admiral Kimmel placed the "bomb plot messages" at the center of his charges against 
the administration. He pointed out that Pearl Harbor was the only harbor or base in 
American possession which was divided into sub areas: "In no other area was the 
Japanese government seeking information into whether two armed vessels were along the 
same wharf." Kimmel asserted that had he received this information, he would have taken 
different actions.36 Both Theobald and Kimmel argued that these messages gave the 
administration definitive proof that the attack would come at Pearl Harbor 
and insisted that Kimmel should have been informed of them.
In contrast to revisionist methods, one needs to keep in mind that the President and his 
war council were not reading the past but attempting to predict the future moves of an
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adversary. In defense of the administration, supporters pointed to the problems of 
interpreting mass amounts of information. Much of the data had to be decoded, 
translated, interpreted and disseminated to the proper authorities. There were mistakes 
and delays. The various official and private investigations had the advantage of knowing 
what they were looking for when conducting their searches. The controversy developed, 
because the investigations revealed that the administration did have a lot of information. 
However, the officials involved claimed that proper interpretation was not as easy as 
hindsight led others to believe.
The administration's principal defense was not that it was completely ignorant of the 
situation but that the information could be interpreted in various ways. In general they 
were not sure what to expect, and those who did make a prognosis figured that the war 
would start in the Far East. Roosevelt told the cabinet at a meeting on December 7, "We 
believed the Japanese would do something."37 A few hours before the attack, Hull told 
other officials, "The Japs are planning some devilry." However, Hull, Stimson and Knox 
were wondering where the attack would fall.38 Hull claimed that the military should not 
have been surprised since he had repeatedly warned of a surprise attack anywhere.39
Marshall and Stark were questioned extensively by the Joint Committee concerning the 
information the United States had prior to the attack. Stark clearly stated that he had not 
had any direct or advance information that Japan was going to attack the United States.40 
He admitted that although a strike on Pearl Harbor was a possibility, he had doubted it 
would happen.41 He claimed that Japan had outwitted everyone by moving in more than 
one direction, the attention of the administration being focused on the Japanese 
movements into Southeast Asia. Marshall also claimed to have been duped by the 
southern advance. He explained the lack of concern over Pearl Harbor by saying that he 
had felt Pearl Harbor was prepared to meet an attack and figured that the Japanese would 
never undertake such a risky operation 42
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Neither Stark nor Marshall gave much credit to the "bomb plot messages." The former 
testified that he had no recollection of them, but probably would have considered the 
messages as basic examples of Japanese attention to detail, keeping track of the American 
fleet in case of war.43 Marshall claimed that the messages were not unique to Pearl 
Harbor, that the Japanese had made inquiries about Naval vessels all over the Pacific. He 
stated that this "dispersed their attention."44 Marshall's claims were supported by the 
evidence. The collection of intercepted messages put forth by the Joint Committee 
revealed numerous messages asking for information concerning American ships in the 
Philippines, Panama, the Far East and in the United States. Although these places had not 
been divided into sub areas as Pearl Harbor had been, Tokyo was nevertheless asking for 
and receiving information on ships, planes and defenses outside of Hawaii.45 Looking at 
the number of documents, one can imagine how the American officials may have 
misinterpreted the information.
Another important officer who had access to the information and defended the 
administration was William Friedman. The man who broke the Purple code, in a pamphlet 
that was not declassified until 1981, explained why the administration failed to predict the 
attack despite the information they had. He said that the problem was that no one person 
"studied the whole story Magic was telling." No one was responsible for putting all the 
clues together to study the long range view of the situation.46 He discussed the problems 
inherent in processing the information. Most importantly, he argued that there was 
nothing in Magic that explicitly pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor, nor could 
there have been. He pointed out that Magic was the information gained from decoding 
the diplomatic code, and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo who sent the diplomatic 
messages testified that he had not known about the plan to attack Hawaii. If Togo told 
the truth, than Magic did not reveal where Japan planned to strike.47
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War Messages
Even if the administration did not know positively where the attack would occur, 
certainly the President had enough intelligence data to realize that relations were quickly 
deteriorating to a state o f war, but did he conspire to withhold this information? Prior to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, senior members of the United States Government knew 
that the secret Japanese deadline for completion of negotiations had passed. They knew 
that the Japanese had instructed their embassies to destroy code machines as well as secret 
files and warned that "things would automatically begin to happen." Tension between the 
two countries increased as did Japan's interest in specific data on the ships and defenses in 
Pearl Harbor. Washington had all this information, but the commanders in Oahu did not. 
The questions over whether or not the commanders had sufficient information and why 
they had not been provided all of the information inspired much debate.
Stark and Stimson, who both sent warning messages to Hawaii in late November, 
claimed that the commanders were informed on what was happening and therefore should 
have been prepared for anything. Stark's message to Kimmel actually began with the 
words, "This message is to be considered a war warning." Stark claimed it was an 
unequivocal war warning. Although it directed attention to a possible attack on the 
Philippines and other locations in the Far East, Stark noted that it did not exclude Hawaii 
and actually notified Kimmel to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment."48 Stark 
argued that Kimmel should have been prepared, because Kimmel himself had written to 
Stark earlier in 1941 about the possibility of surprise attack on Hawaii by Japan. In 
addition, Stark noted that he sent Kimmel a message on December 3 which informed him 
that the Japanese were ordering their embassies and consulates to destroy their codes and 
secret documents. Stark emphasized that Washington had received the diplomatic 
information, evaluated it and sent the conclusions and recommendations to Hawaii. He 
asserted that Kimmel had received enough information from Washington.49
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While Stark was informing Kimmel, Stimson sent a message to General Walter Short, 
the Commanding General in Hawaii and the man responsible for the defense of the Fleet 
when it was in harbor. Stimson had sent the message, because Marshall was out of 
Washington to observe manuevers. Although the message did not precisely warn of an air 
attack on Pearl Harbor, Stimson thought the warning was sufficient. He testified that 
Short, having been warned, should have remained on alert "like a sentinel on duty."50 The 
majority of the Joint Committee agreed with Stark and Stimson, blaming the Pearl Harbor 
commanders for failing to take the necessary steps to protect the fleet.51
The conspiracists disagreed with this assessment. They argued that the message was 
unclear and failed to convey the severity of the situation. Admiral Kimmel defended his 
own actions in response to this so called "war warning" by claiming that it was ambiguous. 
He argued that it warned of war in the Far East.52 He also noted that on the day he 
received the warning, he was directed to send fifty percent of his planes as well as his 
carriers on a mission away from the base. From these orders, Kimmel understood that 
Washington did not expect an attack on Pearl Harbor.53 Senators Ferguson and Brewster 
agreed with Kimmel. They wrote in the M inority Report, "The War Department and the 
Navy Department did not instruct Short and Kimmel to put into effect an all-out war 
alert."54
Admiral Theobald saw the message as clear evidence that information was being 
purposely withheld. He pointed out that the authorities in Washington knew that in the 
days preceding the attack the Hawaiian commanders were not taking actions 
commensurate with the situation; they were preparing for sabotage. Washington should 
have given further orders to the base commanders, but it did not. Theobald emphasized 
that the military leaders would not have made such a mistake. They would have sent a 
clear warning or taken steps to ensure the safety of Pearl Harbor, particularly officers as
41
competent as Harold Stark and George Marshall. He concluded that the only explanation 
for the negligent actions of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations was that 
they were acting under orders from President Roosevelt.55
As further evidence of Roosevelt's complicity, Theobald referred to a statement by 
Admiral Stark. The Chief of Naval Operations stated that his conscience was clear, 
"because all his official reactions in the days before Pearl Harbor had been governed by 
orders from higher authority." Theobald reminded the reader that the only higher authority 
was the President.56
Events of December 6 and 7
Stark's preceding statement was only one of many controversial statements by both him 
and General Marshall. Their testimonies of what they were doing on the sixth and seventh 
of December precipitated more debate. The argument over the war messages was based 
on the interpretation of those messages and thus the administration was able to defend 
itself to some degree. However, the actions of key officials in Washington just prior to the 
attack were far more difficult to justify and provided further impetus to the revisionist 
attack. As previously mentioned, the government had translated the first thirteen parts of 
the Japanese reply on December 6. Although it was not a declaration of war, the 
language of the dispatch provided evidence that negotiations were finished. Roosevelt had 
declared, "This means war." On the morning of the seventh, while Hull waited for the 
Japanese to commit some "devilry," additional dispatches hinted that war would begin at 
one o'clock Washington time, early morning in Hawaii, which was supposed to be an ideal 
time for an air attack. Admiral Stark received the dispatches on December 7 at nine in the 
morning, which was 3:30 A.M. Hawaii time. He said, "My God! This means war. I must 
get word to Kimmel at once."57 However, he did not act on these words. No message 
was sent in time to alert the commanders in Pearl Harbor.
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The official explanation of what transpired did little to alleviate doubts. The 
revisionists attacked the actions of the civilian and military leaders, claiming they were 
either guilty o f incompetence or of conspiring to allow the attack to occur. In support of 
these claims they addressed the following items which did not make sense:
1. Roosevelt, after declaring "This means war," did not meet with the 
leaders of the military nor even speak with Marshall until after the attack.
2. Neither Marshall nor Stark could remember what they were doing on 
the eve of the attack.
3. Captain Harold D. Krick, Stark's friend, told Congress he had been 
with Stark on the night of the sixth. He revealed that Stark had spoken to 
Roosevelt on the phone that night and then had told Krick that 
"conditions in the Pacific were serious and relations with Japan were in a 
critical state."58 Still, Stark could not recall the subject of his conversation 
with Roosevelt.59
4. Both Marshall and Stark claimed that they had not received the first 13 
parts of the Japanese reply until the morning of the seventh, although it had 
come in on the afternoon of the sixth.
5. Marshall did not arrive at his office until almost 11:00 A.M., because he 
had been riding his horse that morning.
6. Stark decided to do nothing until Marshall arrived.
7. Neither Stark nor Marshall sent any warning to Oahu until almost noon. 
Marshall decided to send the message. Marshall could have used his 
scrambler phone to call directly. He could have used the naval 
communications system. Instead he sent the warning via Western Union 
and RCA radio, because heavy static had blacked out the army's radio 
circuits. The message did not get to General Short until more than seven 
hours after the attack began.60
8. Colonel Rufus Bratton told the Army Pearl Harbor Board that he had 
given the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to Marshall's secretary on 
the sixth. However, he then told Congress that he must have been 
mistaken, because "honorable men" such as Marshall and others said they 
had not received them.61
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During the various investigations, Stark and Marshall were repeatedly questioned 
about what had happened. Both defended themselves and provided a number o f plausible 
explanations which the conspiracists omitted or belittle in their writings. Both officers 
created speculation by their memory lapses; however, Marshall reminded the Joint 
Committee that it had been four years from Pearl Harbor to his testimony and that he had 
spent those four years occupied with the war effort. Marshall also explained that his 
horseback ride was not a bizarre occurrence but part of his normal Sunday morning 
routine.62 Against charges that he had been in the office, not riding a horse, Marshall 
provided proof in the form of a memo from the secretary to the General Staff that he 
arrived around 11:00 A M .63
Both officers defended their actions regarding the transmission of warnings on the 
morning of the seventh. Stark stated that he hesitated to send an additional warning to 
Kimmel, because he was afraid that sending too many warnings would cause confusion.64 
He did not explain how this would have caused confusion. Marshall explained that he 
had chosen not to use the scrambler phone on his desk, because he had needed to alert all 
theatres. He claimed he had thought that the attack was more likely to come at the 
Philippines or the Panama Canal, and thus most likely would have called those places 
before Oahu. He asserted that he was trying to get information to divers places 
simultaneously and felt that phoning each command individually would take too much 
time, particularly due to the odd hour of the day in some of the places.65
Colonel Edward F. French of the Army Signal Corps defended the use of Western 
Union and RCA. He noted that the army had used that route before and had found it both 
accurate as well as quick. He pointed out that the RCA transmitter was four times as 
powerful as the Army's. French also admitted that he never told Marshall what route the 
message would take.66 According to these statements, Marshall had not purposely sent 
the message to Pearl Harbor by the most roundabout route but had tried to dispatch the 
message to a number of places as quickly as possible. Marshall told the Roberts'
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Commission that army officials assured him that the message would arrive in Hawaii 
around 7:00 A.M. and thus expected the message to arrive on time.67
This testimony did not convince the conspiracists. Examining all the evidence, they 
maintained their opinion that these strange actions pointed to a cover up. George 
Morgenstem summed up his suspicions regarding what happened in Washington prior to 
the attack:
What went on at the White House and among the officials of the 
government and of the Army and Navy high command that night is a 
mystery which still awaits solution ... It is about inconceivable that the 
witnesses still alive can have forgotten what happened, but General 
Marshall and Admiral Stark repeatedly testified under oath that they cannot 
remember."68
Men who acted decisively at many times in their careers both before and after Pearl 
Harbor did not act decisively at such a crucial time and could not remember what they had 
been doing. The lack of a satisfactory explanation for these activities combined with the 
charges by the revisionists made this issue one of the strongest of the controversy and one 
that continued to cause dispute. Even when the Marshall Foundation released the 
Marshall papers in 1963, the New York Times questioned why Marshall could not 
remember what he was doing on the sixth, why he was so late getting to his office, and 
why he did not use the scrambler phone.69
The Winds Messages
Another item which developed out of contradicting testimonies to become a focal point 
of the revisionist attack and remain at the center of the controversy for decades was the 
"Winds Message." This controversy began with Japanese fears of losing communication 
with their embassies and consulates as the situation deteriorated. On November 19,
Tokyo instructed its embassy in Washington that if an emergency situation developed and 
international communications were cut, it would deliver a secret message in its daily short
45
wave newscast. The message would be hidden in the weather report. Separate codes 
were established for problems with America, Britain and Russia. Higashi No Kazeame 
meaning "East Wind Rain" was to signal that relations between Japan and the United 
States were in danger. If the message was heard, the embassy was to destroy all its codes 
and secret papers.70
After this message, the United States was vigilant in listening for a "Winds Execute 
Message," the actual broadcast of the signal. However, after the war, military officers 
disagreed over whether or not the United States had ever received a "Winds Execute 
Message." Commander Laurance Safford, U.S.N., the Chief of Security Intelligence 
Communications, initiated the dispute. He testified that at 8:30 AM on December 4th, the 
radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland received a "Winds Execute Message." 
According to Safford, Captain Alwin Kramer brought the message to him and had written 
the translation on it, "War with England, War with the United States, Peace with Russia." 
Safford assured the Joint Committee that he sent one copy to his superior, Rear Admiral 
Noyes, six or seven copies to the army and additional copies to other people on the Magic 
distribution list. He boldly stated, "It was a Winds Message. It meant war and we knew it 
meant war."71 Safford could not produce a copy of the message but claimed that there 
was a blank file in the office safe which he insisted represented the missing message.72
Safford's testimony was controversial, because none of the people to whom he 
allegedly distributed the message corroborated his testimony. Captain Kramer was in 
charge of the OP-20-G subsection responsible for translating decrypted ciphers and 
recovery of Japanese codes and the man who Safford claimed gave him the message. 
Kramer denied that he had received a Winds Message pertaining to the United States 
before December but did testify to seeing a Winds Message that signified a break in 
diplomatic relations with Great Britain. He also discussed the missing or cancelled
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message in the files of the messages. He reported that it was not unusual for there to be 
blanks in the files for various reasons and noted that there were similar cancelled numbers 
in the files for 1940.73
In spite o f Safford's statement that he had sent copies of the message to the Army, 
three army intelligence officers denied ever seeing it. Both Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, the 
Chief of Far East Intelligence, and Otis K. Sadtler, the Chief of Signals Intelligence, 
professed to seeing a message that meant a break between Japan and Great Britain, not the 
United States.74 Bratton also declared that had the U. S. received a Winds Execute 
Message, it would not have been important, because it did not give any new information. 
They already knew that Japan was preparing for war; the Winds Message would not have 
specified the plan of attack.75
William Friedman, who claimed to have been in the best position of anyone in 
Washington to see a Winds Execute Message, agreed with Bratton's analysis of its 
importance and argued against its existence.76 At the Hewitt Inquiry, Friedman affirmed 
that the U. S. did not intercept such a message until late at night on the seventh, after the 
attack. This conformed with the stated Japanese purpose to use the code if their 
communications were disrupted.77 In private notes written shortly after the Congressional 
hearings, Friedman admitted that Safford clearly thought that he had seen a Winds 
Execute, but Friedman postulated that Safford had seen a false message.78
Despite the lack of proof and the numerous statements to the contrary, the revisionists 
insisted that Safford had told the truth. Percy Greaves charged the administration with 
attempting to conceal the affair, pointing out that certain individuals changed their 
statements. He criticized the Hewitt Inquiry for only calling witnesses who had previously 
testified to seeing the message and getting them to change their story under further 
questioning.79 George Morgenstem charged the administration with denying the 
existence of the message, stealing the copies of it, and forcing or bribing those who had
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seen it to remain silent or change their testimony. He labeled these actions among "the 
great scandals of Pearl Harbor."80
The Majority Report o f the Joint Committee ruled that there was too much evidence 
against such a message having been received.81 However, the revisionist attacks kept the 
issue alive in the minds of the public and caused them to doubt the official statements.
The issue would remain and after three decades rise again with the revelation of further 
evidence. (See Chapter Four.)
Conclusion
In the decade following the Second World War, two groups challenged the official 
findings on the Pearl Harbor attack. Examining the information made available by the 
government, both the defenders of Admiral Husband Kimmel and the revisionists found 
support for their causes. Although they could not produce any direct proof that Roosevelt 
and his advisors had known that the Japanese would strike Pearl Harbor on the morning of 
December seventh, they did bring forth sufficient information to raise doubt about the 
claims of the administration. These writers argued that diplomatic and military actions 
hinted that Roosevelt wanted war with Japan. They displayed information that when 
pieced together properly suggested that the administration should have known the 
Japanese plans. They criticized the vague warnings to the commanders in Oahu. They 
also pointed out how the discrepancies and omissions in the testimonies of key 
officials alluded to the withholding of information and a coverup of misdeeds.
In order to prove their argument, Kimmel, Theobald and the revisionists relied on a 
conspiracy theory. Only a conspiracy by top officials could have succeeded in withholding 
the information, concealing the facts, and silencing those who knew the truth. By forging 
this thesis and demonstrating how the evidence supported it, the conspiracists created a 
stir and escalated the controversy.
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Theobald and Kimmel hoped only to prove that the latter had been used as a 
scapegoat; the revisionists pursued a much larger agenda and ultimately failed. Although 
they challenged the actions of the Roosevelt administration, the revisionists did not reverse 
the course of American foreign policy nor alter American opinion about the war. More 
than three decades have passed since Barnes' Perpetual War fo r  Perpetual Peace and in 
that time, America has consistently maintained a global approach to foreign affairs.
Recent actions in Somalia, Iraq and Haiti have only emphasized this. Textbooks focus on 
the glory and importance of America's participation in World War Two. The hopes of the 
Pearl Harbor revisionists failed to materialize; yet, those writers did create doubts over 
Pearl Harbor. Even with the decline of the revisionist cause, the controversy continued.
CHAPTER m
REVISIONISM CHALLENGED, HINDERED AND REVISED
The revisionist view of Pearl Harbor peaked in the decade after the war. The 
revisionists based their arguments on the belief that Roosevelt had known of the attack 
and wanted it to happen. Examining the information collected by Congress, these writers 
capitalized on the exposure of secret information, various comments by officials, claims by 
the base commanders, hints of additional, unrevealed secrets and the memory lapses as 
well as the mistakes of key officials. They used this information and filled the void 
between it and their theories to construct arguments which, although based on 
circumstantial evidence, were outwardly convincing. These interpretations sustained the 
doubts which had developed amidst the unanswered charges and secrecy of the war years.
However, the revisionists did not provide the only conclusions concerning the attack 
on Pearl Harbor. Other writers disputed the revisionist attacks and aimed to defend 
the administration by offering alternative interpretations that were not based on missing 
evidence and conspiracies. At the same time, the revisionists encountered opposition in 
the media and difficulties in publishing their views. Realist and New Left historians fit 
Pearl Harbor into their own ideas. Even Henry Elmer Barnes revised his account by 
narrowing the scope of the original conspiracy theory. By the end of the sixties, the 
Revisionist Theory of Pearl Harbor had lost some of its greatest proponents, and the 
controversy over the attack continued to fade throughout the seventies.
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Attacking the Revisionists
Many writers defended the administration, attempting to show that the government had 
done everything to keep peace while preparing for war and avoiding a policy of 
appeasement. They admitted that mistakes were made, but insisted that these were honest 
mistakes justified by the situation and the structural and personal limitations involved.
They explicitly disputed the charges of conspiracy and challenged both the logic and the 
evidence behind those charges.
In 1948 Samuel Eliot Morison published one of the first defenses of the administration 
in the third volume of his History o f the United States Naval Operations in World War
II. Morison articulated one of the central ideas in the challenge to revisionism: that the 
administration had been vigilant and attentive to the information but had focused on 
the wrong place. He argued that the administration had discovered that the Japanese were 
preparing for war and did not attempt to conceal that information from the commanders 
in Oahu. To support this, he pointed out that the military leaders gave warnings to those 
commanders and claimed the warnings were clear. Morison argued that one fault of the 
American leaders was their belief that the attack would occur in the Far East, which 
resulted in them ignoring the warning signs related to Pearl Harbor.1 Seth Richardson, the 
General Consul to the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee, concurred with this 
assessment. In an article in The Saturday Evening Post, he said that the reoccupation 
with Southeast Asia and a belief in Hawaii’s invulnerability allowed the military to miss 
important signals.2
Some writers went beyond just defending the administration and attacked the 
revisionists directly. Morison criticized Charles Beard for being a relativist and 
for selecting only facts which fit into his frame of reference.3 Robert Ferrell called the 
revisionists "violent and angry men" and criticized Perpetual War fo r  Perpetual Peace for 
lacking objectivity. Ferrell argued that the disaster was caused by military errors and was 
not a matter of "diplomatic planning."4 Hans Louis Trefouse blamed the Japanese for
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choosing to go to war and edited a book containing the important documents pertaining to 
the controversy. He insisted that these documents did not divulge where the Japanese 
were planning to strike. Claiming that the fault lay in mistakes, oversights and lack of 
intelligence information, he accused the conspiracists o f being "willing to believe the worst 
of men they had come to hate. "5
Basil Rauch’s Roosevelt, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, published in 1950, also 
attacked the revisionists and their arguments. In the beginning of the book he asserted 
that it was not difficult to find proof that refuted the "isolationist thesis."6 He also 
accused Charles Beard of attempting to destroy "the faith of America in the honesty of 
President Roosevelt."7 Claiming that Hull and Roosevelt negotiated in good faith, Rauch 
contested the revisionists by placing the blame on the Japanese. He argued that the 
Japanese were not only unwilling to compromise but were guilty of delivering an 
ultimatum. To Rauch, the secret deadline messages did more than reveal Japanese war 
intentions; they presented an ultimatum complete with demands, a specific deadline and 
the threat of repercussions if the demands were not met.8 He argued that the winds 
messages were unimportant and that the only bomb plot messages that discussed an aerial 
attack were not decoded until after the attack.9
Herbert Feis, in an article for the Yale Review in 1956, challenged the revisionist 
evaluation of pre-war American foreign policy. Rejecting the notion that the U.S. wanted 
war with Japan, he argued that Roosevelt had not made promises to the British and Dutch 
to enter the war and that American leaders sought to avoid dividing American forces.
Feis also discussed a few ideas that the revisionists had not considered. He supported the 
embargo on Japan on the grounds that America could not trade war goods to the Japanese 
due to the latter's alliance with Germany, a potential American enemy.10 Feis countered 
the belief that Hull's ten point proposal was an ultimatum by pointing out that the Japanese 
reply never accused America of giving an ultimatum but of impeding Japanese goals.11
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Japanese Views
The anti-revisionist views involved opposing interpretations of the evidence, but 
information from Japan was more damaging to some of the revisionist claims. In 
testimony at the Tokyo Trials, in recovered documents, in interviews with historians or in 
their own works, former Japanese officials provided additional insight into what had 
happened. In 1946, the Japanese Navy released data on the planning and operation of the 
attack. It contradicted the idea that Roosevelt had long known when the attack would 
occur. According to the report, the Japanese cabinet did not decide on the date until the 
second of December, 1941.12
In 1951, Robert Ward provided Japanese evidence contrasting the charge that 
Roosevelt had lured the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor. Ward insisted that the Japanese 
had been planning to attack Pearl Harbor from as early as January of 1941, months before 
any ’’ultimatum1' that may have provoked Japan. He asserted that it was the Japanese 
admiral, Isoroku Yamamoto, who had developed the plan over the course of the year and 
insisted that it be implemented.13 Ward explained how Japanese efforts to maintain 
secrecy was the major reason that America was surprised by the attack. These efforts 
included the Navy keeping the plans secret from the rest of the government, maintenance 
of strict radio silence by the attacking fleet and the transfer o f the regular radio officers 
from this fleet to other ships in Japanese waters to further impede efforts to find the 
carriers.14 Thus, Ward's paper highlighted the successes of an intelligent, perfectly- 
executed Japanese plan as opposed to American failure or duplicity.
In 1956, Shigemori Togo, who had been the Japanese Foreign Minister in 1941, wrote 
an article for U.S. News and World Report. He blamed the Roosevelt administration for 
not trusting Japan, negotiating half-heartedly and pushing Japan into the war.15 However, 
he also confirmed the stealth involved in the planning, admitting that he had no prior 
knowledge of the plans to strike Hawaii. He claimed that the Japanese Navy kept the 
plans secret and only asked that negotiations be continued until the attack.16 These
53
statements put into doubt the charge that Togo's diplomatic communication, intercepted 
and decoded by the United States, revealed the plan to attack Hawaii.
The Media
Another element which thwarted revisionist efforts was the bias o f the media and 
publication industry. Both gave more support to pro-Roosevelt books and articles than to 
those of the revisionists. As early as 1953, Barnes complained that the revisionist writers 
were the victims of a smear campaign and attempts to prevent them from publishing. 
Barnes stated that only a few small publishing companies would print the revisionist 
works. He insisted that important periodicals such as Time, Newsweek, The New Yorker, 
The Nation and The National Review ignored the revisionist theories or attacked them 
with "great ferocity and unfairness."17 Detailing the attacks against the revisionists, 
Barnes argued vehemently against many of the allegations.
Barnes was not being paranoid. The mainstream media did argue against the 
revisionists. The New York Times and The New York Herald Tribune employed prominent 
anti-revisionist writers such as Rauch, Samuel Flagg Bemis and Arthur Schlesinger to 
review revisionist works.18 The Times agreed with Morison's opinion that the 
administration did not know what the Japanese were planning and that the administration 
was focused on events in Indo-China.19
After the publication of Theobald's book, the Times questioned Marshall and Stark.
The New York paper solicited responses to Theobald's charges that the Pacific Fleet was 
used as a decoy to make the Japanese attack and that the two military men had received 
orders to withhold information from Short and Kimmel. On April 18th, 1954 the Times 
reported that both had emphatically answered "no" to the queries.20
Barnes recognized the declining influence of the revisionist version of Pearl Harbor and 
blamed it on the collaboration between the government and the historical profession. He
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compared this to the control over society in George Orwell's 1984, claiming that 
"historical writing and interpretation are being brought into line with the needs and 
attitudes of a sick political regime."21 As evidence, he cited the vast number of historians 
who had entered into war propaganda work, Truman's move to establish a group of 
official historians and the growing number of historians openly supporting the cold war.22 
He charged the government with attempts at thought control in relation to the Pearl 
Harbor dispute through their use of official historians, removal and destruction of 
documents, classification of information as top secret and forcing officials to alter 
their testimonies.23 Barnes feared that the anti- revisionists would succeed in blacking out 
the revisionist arguments.
New Ideas
The sixties brought new ideas and new challenges to revisionism. In 1962, Roberta 
Wohlstetter published what The New York Times labeled the "distinct book" on Pearl 
Harbor.24 Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision altered the debate and helped to quell 
the controversy, because it moved the focus away from whom to blame and disregarded 
the arguments over the direction of America's foreign policy. Using her background as an 
intelligence expert and concentrating on the lessons that could be learned from the failures, 
Wohlstetter argued that the disaster was caused by a series of mistakes and explained how 
these could affect America's future. According to her, the main reasons for these blunders 
were: the surfeit of irrelevant intelligence; the bias in Washington for information on the 
European Theater o f Operations; the failure to act on certain warnings in many branches 
of the military including the intelligence division and the Hawaiian commands; the 
evidence available to support the wrong interpretations; the efforts of the Japanese to hide 
the relevant signals; the desire of the United States to keep secret what it knew and normal 
bureaucratic problems.
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Many of Wohlstetter's conclusions contradicted those of the revisionists, particularly 
her assessment of the information available to the government prior to the war. She 
contested the belief that the "bomb plot messages" provided clear proof that Pearl Harbor 
was the designated target, claiming that the Army and Navy intelligence units 
misinterpreted the information. In support of this, she noted the testimony of several 
naval officers who stated at the Congressional Hearings that they had not determined 
absolutely why the information was being requested. One officer noted that Tokyo could 
have wanted to determine the speed at which the fleet could set to sea in case of actions 
elsewhere.25 Wohlstetter said that there were similar requests relating to other ports in 
the United States and its territories. She conceded that the government could have 
noticed the increasing Japanese demands for information on Pearl Harbor and the 
Philippines, but insisted that nobody had separated the useful information from the 
useless.26
She explained the lack of attention to dispatches such as the "bomb plot messages by:
the very human tendency to pay attention to the signals that support 
current expectations about enemy behavior. If  one is listening to the 
signals of an attack against a highly improbable target, then it is very 
difficult for the signals to be heard.27
Wohlstetter argued that the ambiguous war warnings were not evidence of a sinister 
plot. Her interpretation was that the ambiguity was typical. It reflected the hesitancy of 
intelligence officers to make definite predictions about events which could be reversed at 
the last minute. She added that a full alert was dangerous in that it could have led to a 
situation where the U.S. had to make an overt act against Japan.28
Wohlstetter dulled the controversy by taking the matter away from the key 
administration officials and explaining it in terms of the limitations inherent in intelligence 
work. Two decades after Pearl Harbor, she stressed that it was not the result of a 
conspiracy but of the type of failures that could happen again. She said:
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If the study of Pearl Harbor has anything to offer for the future, it is this:
We have to accept the fact o f uncertainty and learn to live with it. No 
magic, in code or otherwise, will provide certainty. Our plans must work 
without it.29
Other neutral opinions appeared in the fifties and sixties. George Kennan took a realist 
approach to the situation. Denying the existence of a conspiracy, he stressed that 
America's failure was in neglecting to pursue all possibilities.30 The New Left Historians 
Walter Lefeber and William Appleman Williams criticized Roosevelt for pursuing the 
policy of the open door and international trade to solve domestic economic troubles. 
Although they remained neutral on the Pearl Harbor issue, they emphasized that 
America's insistence on the open door led to economic interventionism, which in term led 
to conflicts with Japan over resources in the Far East.31
A New Revisionist Theory
Regardless of the new theories and the difficulties that revisionism faced, Barnes did 
not accept defeat in the sixties. In the light of new evidence, he revised the conspiracy 
theory, limiting the blame to Marshall and Roosevelt. In an article for The National 
Review in 1966, Barnes exonerated Frank Knox, the former Secretary of the Navy. He 
credited Knox with trying to send a warning message to Pearl Harbor on the sixth and 
blamed Marshall and Roosevelt for the message not getting to Hawaii.32
Two years later, he wrote ''Pearl Harbor after a Quarter of a Century" for the journal 
Left and Right in which he expanded on his idea of a limited conspiracy involving less 
people and beginning much later. He argued that Roosevelt did not learn of the Japanese 
intentions until December 4th, and worked with Marshall over the following three days to 
prevent word leaking to Kimmel and Short. He admitted that the failure o f the October 
bomb plot messages to reach Admiral Kimmel was not Roosevelt's fault but that of 
Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, the head of Naval War plans. Barnes excused Turner,
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claiming that he was not guilty of conspiracy but of preoccupation with events in the 
Atlantic.33 He also saw Admiral Stark as a minor member of the conspiracy who had 
been prevented against his will from informing Kimmel.34
According to Barnes, Roosevelt was determined to get the United States into the war 
but needed a Japanese attack to assure public support for the war effort. On December 4, 
Roosevelt learned that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor but feared that if 
the Hawaiian commanders were warned, their actions might prevent the attack from 
occurring.35 Barnes argued that Marshall was indebted to the President and thus followed 
Roosevelt's orders to keep the Pearl Harbor commanders uninformed. Marshall then 
informed Stark to do the same. This theory explained why Stark called Roosevelt on the 
morning of the seventh and then did not call Kimmel. It explained why Marshall 
disappeared for the afternoon of the sixth and morning of the seventh and did not arrive in 
time to send a warning that would arrive before the air strike.36 Barnes claimed that 
Marshall had told Senator Barkley at the Congressional hearings that he could not reveal 
where he had been the night of December 6th, as it would have "got the Chief (Roosevelt) 
in trouble. "37
Barnes attested that there were new pieces of information which proved that by 
December 4th, Roosevelt knew about Japanese intentions to attack the United States. He 
claimed that British intelligence in the Far East had informed London that the Japanese 
were going to attack the United States; a Russian spy, Richard Sorge, had informed 
Stalin that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor; and an anonymous American Army 
Intelligence officer had gained knowledge of the Japanese plan and notified Washington.38
Barnes also drew conclusions from General Henry H. Arnold's trip to the west coast in 
the days preceding Pearl Harbor. He argued that Arnold, the Chief of the Army Air 
Corps, would not have been allowed out of Washington for the official purpose of 
expediting a flight of bombers to the Philippines. Barnes claimed that Arnold, knowing
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the attack was coming and worrying about his planes, flew to the West Coast to disperse 
planes concentrated in one spot to prevent sabotage.39
Two decades after the first revisionist books on the war, Barnes' article demonstrated 
that the revisionists had not given up on their accusations against Roosevelt. He made a 
convincing argument that explained many of the questionable actions of the military 
leaders and claimed that Roosevelt had received evidence about the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. However, he still lacked direct proof to support his argument.
Into the Seventies
Barnes died in 1968, shortly after finishing his article for Left and Right and with his 
passing, the controversy over Pearl Harbor began to decline. The revisionist goals had 
failed. Rather than returning to a policy of isolationism, America was involved in another 
war in Asia. During the 1970's the media paid little attention to the dispute and rarely 
mentioned Pearl Harbor outside of anniversary pieces. Without further proof, the 
revisionists could not convince people that their interpretations were correct. Their 
allegations that had fueled the controversy during and immediately after the war were less 
convincing under closer review of the information. Opposing interpretations were also 
convincing and depended less on alleged information.
In the seventies historians had a new war and new controversies to study. The few 
books on the subject that were published treated the revisionist accusations as 
history. A 1973 book, Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese- American Relations, 1931- 
1941, barely covered the controversy. It focused on analyzing the foreign policies of both 
countries rather than determining whether or not there was a conspiracy. George Waller's 
Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt and the Coming o f the War, published in 1976 was a collection 
of official documents and articles which included the works of revisionists, administration 
officials, Roberta Wohlstetter and more recent scholars like Akira Iriye and George
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MacGregor Bums. It was written not to advocate one side or the other, but to provide 
examples of the varying viewpoints pertaining to the attack on Pearl Harbor and 
American foreign policy in the years prior to it. By the seventies, the information 
uncovered by the official investigations had been interpreted and reinterpreted in a 
plethora of books, articles and pamphlets. However, without new information, without 
proof for the accusations, the controversy appeared to be fading into the past.
CHAPTER IV 
NEW INFORMATION, SAME DISPUTE
Henry Elmer Barnes predicted in 1953 that it would take a political or economic 
disaster to force the public to change its views and accept revisionism.1 Revisionist 
arguments and the entire Pearl Harbor controversy lost importance in the 1970's, but 
Watergate and the Vietnam War eroded public confidence in America's governing officials 
and in the policy of internationalism. The combination of America's attitude toward its 
government and the revelation of new information pertaining to the attack revived the 
controversy. The most important ingredient for this revival was the renewal of the belief 
that the government was concealing facts.
Information released under the Freedom of Information Act, new allegations from 
those involved, and alternative interpretations ignited the dispute. One interesting 
characteristic of the new debate was that it contained many of the same ingredients as the 
old. John Toland, James Rusbridger and Eric Nave presented new evidence supporting 
the existence of a conspiracy, although the latter two were suggesting new conspirators. 
Gordon Prange, Alvin Coox, Stanley Weintraub and others disputed the conspiracists with 
still more evidence. Katherine Dillon and Donald Goldstein provided additional 
information from Japanese sources. Admiral Edwin Layton and Captain Edward Beach 
continued the defense of Admiral Kimmel. Donald Clausen blamed Kimmel and defended 
Marshall. Others argued that attitudes not individuals were culpable. Thus, after laying 
dormant in the seventies, the Pearl Harbor Controversy charged back in the eighties and 
nineties. Accusations were made and challenged, multiple "Final Books" on Pearl Harbor
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were written, but throughout the time nobody was able to produce the all convincing 
conclusion to the controversy.
New Accusations
John Toland's Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, published in 1982, was the 
book that ignited anew the flames of controversy. Toland wrote the book to address 
questions he felt had never been answered. Using data released under the Freedom of 
Information Act and interviews with people who had been involved, he presented new 
evidence supporting the charge that Roosevelt had prior knowledge of the attack.2 
Specifically, he revived arguments over both the Winds Message and Marshall's actions in 
the last hours before the war. He also charged that the U.S. government had tracked the 
Japanese Fleet, the Kido Butai in its voyage across the Pacific. Some people accepted 
Toland's claims, but others challenged them, leading to further books and articles on the 
subject.
Toland reasoned that the official statements of the events in Washington on the sixth 
and seventh of December, 1941 were false. He reasoned that the President would have 
summoned his Army and Navy commanders to the White House after receiving the first 
thirteen parts of the reply. The official statements showed that Roosevelt did not do this, 
but Toland discovered a letter written by a close friend of Henry Knox. In this 
correspondence, Knox told the friend that "he, Stimson, Marshall, Stark and Harry 
Hopkins had spent most of the night of December 6th at the White House with the 
President." Toland revealed that Stimson's military aide, Major Harrison, claimed that he 
saw Marshall at Stimson's office at ten o'clock on the morning of the seventh, not on 
horseback.3 Toland also questioned Marshall's decision not to use the scrambler phone.
Stanley Weintraub disagreed with Toland. His 1991 work, Long Day's Journey Into 
War, was an hour by hour account of what was happening all over the world on December 
7th, 1941. In it, Weintraub described Marshall's horseback ride on the morning of the
62
seventh and defended Marshall for getting to the office as quickly as possible once he was 
contacted.4 He also added support for Marshall's conviction that the scrambler phone was 
considered unsafe by recounting the comments of Rear Admiral Claude Block, the 
Commandant of the Hawaiian Naval District. Block spoke with Admiral Stark over the 
scrambler phone after the attack, but when Stark asked for damage estimates, Block was 
afraid the line was unsafe.5
Toland also revived the controversy over the Winds Message. Believing that the 
witnesses who changed their testimonies were part of a cover-up and recognizing 
Laurance Safford's conviction that the United States did intercept a Winds Execute 
Message, Toland felt the subject warranted further investigation. He found support for 
Safford in an interview with Chief Warrant Officer Ralph T. Briggs. In this interview, 
conducted in 1977, Briggs claimed that he was the person on duty when the winds 
message was received and that he was forbidden to testify in support of Captain 
Safford.6
The 1977 interview of Briggs by a naval historian supported Toland's claim. Briggs 
had been a naval intercept operator assigned to the Naval Communications Station in 
Cheltenham, Maryland. Briggs declared that on December 4th, 1941 he intercepted a 
message which said, "Higashi No Kazeame." This translated to East Winds Rain, the 
code words for a break in relations with the United States. After receiving the message he 
sent the original and the copies to OP-20-G in Washington where it was disseminated.7 
Briggs claimed that a number of officers were informed of he message including Captain 
Kramer, Admiral Noyes, Admiral Turner, Admiral Stark, Colonel Sadtler, Colonel Bratton 
and General Miles.8 All of these men testified to Congress that they had not seen a Winds 
Message.
Briggs himself was never called before Congress. He said that he met with Safford and 
agreed to testify at the Congressional hearings. However, his commander, Captain John
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Harper, ordered him to neither testify nor contact Safford without his approval. Harper 
told Briggs that "too much has been revealed already" and that he could not explain the 
orders at that point in time.9 Briggs believed that someone with authority over Captain 
Harper applied pressure to prevent his testimony.10 Thus, thirty-six years after Safford's 
claims before Congress, another witness finally supported his testimony.
As with Safford, not everyone believed Briggs and Toland. Admiral Edwin T. Layton 
was skeptical of Brigg's statements. Layton had been the Pacific Fleet's intelligence officer 
in 1941. In 1985, Roger Pineau and John Costello completed Layton's book, And I  Was 
There, in which he questioned Toland's conclusions. Briggs claimed to have recorded the 
dispatch on December 4, just as Safford had said. Layton pointed out that the duty log 
showed Briggs on duty on December 2, not December 4. Layton also argued that without 
the actual document, one could not prove the Winds Message was received. However, he 
did admit that there was substantial evidence of the existence of such a document. Layton 
also agreed with Toland that there was evidence that the British and the Dutch picked up 
such a signal; he believed as well that pressure was used to have some witnesses change 
their testimony.11
Robert William Love, Jr., a professor o f Naval History at the United States Naval 
Academy, attacked Toland's conclusions and argued against the existence of a conspiracy. 
He stressed the Japanese denial of sending a Winds Message prior to the attack. 
Furthermore, he supported earlier assertions that even if a Winds Message was 
transmitted, received and distributed to military officials, it still only meant a break in 
relations, not necessarily war.12
Even more controversial than Toland's information about the Winds Message was his 
assertion that the American government tracked the fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor, the 
Kido Butai. Toland recorded incidents in which people located the fleet and sent the 
information to Washington, but other writers disputed his information. At the center of
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the dispute was Toland's "Seaman Z" who allegedly told Toland that he had picked up the 
radio signals o f the Fleet as it crossed the Pacific and located it east of the International 
Date Line.13
After the identification of "Seaman Z," other writers challenged Toland's argument.
The New York Times reported on December 4th, 1983 that "Seaman Z" had been 
identified as Robert D. Ogg and repeated Ogg's claim that the information was sent to the 
White House.14 The next spring Telford Taylor, former General Consul to the F.C.C. and 
Nuremburg prosecutor, wrote a critical piece about Toland for the Times. Taylor studied 
Ogg's statement to Retired Navy Commander I. G. Neuman in which Ogg admitted that 
he only spoke with Toland at the request of Admiral Kimmel's son. Ogg revealed he had 
no personal knowledge of the radio transmissions, only that his superior had told him that 
they came from the Japanese fleet. He did not know how the signals had been identified, 
thus reflating Toland's claim that he had identified them as carriers. For all Ogg knew, the 
signals could have come from fishing boats.15 Taylor also discredited Toland's claim that 
Ogg's commander, Captain Richard McCullogh, contacted Roosevelt personally with the 
information. Taylor checked with Roosevelt's private secretary who assured him that 
McCullough could not have personally contacted the President without her knowledge 
and she could not remember the man.16
Alvin Coox, the Director of the Japanese Studies Institute at San Diego State 
University, criticized another piece of Toland's evidence. Toland studied the diary of the 
Dutch naval attache to Washington, Captain Johan E. Meijer Ranneft. According to 
Toland, the diary showed that Naval Intelligence detected two Japanese carriers heading 
toward Pearl Harbor. Coox argued that the diary only noted two carriers heading east 
from Japan. There was no word about an attack on Hawaii, but there was an assumption 
that the carriers were in position to observe American moves.17
Stanley Weintraub and Gordon Prange approached the issue from another direction. 
They argued that the United States could not possibly have detected radio emissions from
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the invading force, because the Japanese did not break radio silence. Weintraub credited 
the Japanese with actually removing the transmitting tubes and locking the keys. He 
wrote that even the radios of the aircraft on board the ships were inoperable until just 
prior to the attack.18
Prange was the chief civilian historian attached to General MacArthur's headquarters 
and had access to Japanese documents and officials. After his death, Donald Goldstein 
and Katherine Dillon finished his book, Pearl Harbor: The Verdict o f History. Based on 
the diaries o f Japanese officers and reports of Japanese investigations, Prange argued that 
radio silence was maintained. The transmitting keys were actually sealed to prevent 
accidental transmissions. Prange contradicted Toland’s charge that a radio officer in San 
Francisco picked up the signals. He quoted a former Japanese officer who pointed out the 
technical impossibility of picking up VHF radio signals in San Francisco, four thousand 
miles from their source.19
In 1993, Dillon and Goldstein published some of Prange's evidence in Pearl Harbor 
Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans. The commanders of a Japanese destroyer and a 
Japanese submarine wrote of the importance of secrecy and that the fleet did not break 
radio silence.20 A Japanese study of the operation disclosed that the fuses had been taken 
out of the radios and the transmitting keys sealed.21 It also pointed out that when 
communication was broken by a submarine on the return trip, the Americans acted 
immediately.22
Other information in The Pearl Harbor Papers provided a better understanding of the 
extent of Japanese efforts to maintain secrecy in the planning and execution of the attack. 
Minoru Genda, who drafted the operational plan of attack, related the difficulty in 
planning the operation when only a few high ranking naval officers knew the details of the 
plan.23 He reported that the men involved could only guess at the target of the attack for 
which they were training and that most did not believe it would be Hawaii.24
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In the 1940's, Americans, believing in Japanese inferiority, were quick to assume that 
Japan could not possibly have achieved complete surprise. However, the information 
uncovered by Prange, Dillon and Goldstein added to the earlier statements of Togo and 
others, showed that the Japanese put tremendous effort into shrouding their plans and 
actions. Many of the works of the 1980's and 1990's emphasized the aspect of Japanese 
secrecy. In contrast to earlier writers, the majority of writers in recent decades believe 
that Roosevelt neither had information of the Japanese Fleet nor had learned of the attack 
through Magic. They moved away from the old revisionist theories.
A Different Conspiracy
James Rusbridger and Eric Nave agreed that the Kido Butai maintained radio silence 
and that decrypts of the diplomatic traffic gave no warning of the attack. They argued 
that the conspiracy theories involving the President were illogical and lacked proof 
However, the author's did believe that the Japanese revealed their plans and that both the 
British including Winston Churchill and some members of the United States Navy knew it. 
In Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II, 
Rusbridger and Nave argued that both the British and the American navies had broken the 
Japanese Naval Code, JN-25, and thus decoded the final commands from Tokyo to the 
Japanese Fleet.
Eric Nave was an Australian cryptologist who broke the JN-25 code for the British.
He claimed that the British were reading the messages from Tokyo to their ships from 
1939 onward.25 Thus, the British read Isoruku Yamamoto's message to the Kido Butai to 
depart on November 26th and arrive at the refueling point by December fourth. Nave said 
that he and the other British intelligence officers figured that Pearl Harbor was the only 
possible target for this action.26 The authors said that if Churchill told Roosevelt about 
this message, it would explain the President's abandonment of the Modus Vivendi in late 
November. However, they argued that Churchill never told Roosevelt in order to keep
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the President from warning Hawaii and thus ensuring American entry into the war.27 
Nave said that the British also intercepted the message from Yamamoto that gave the date 
of the attack 28
Like previous conspiracy writers, Rusbridger and Nave could not produce proof of 
Churchill's actions but relied on circumstantial evidence. They had Nave’s recollections 
that the British intercepted the messages and sent the information to Churchill. They also 
highlighted suspicious actions by the British government. It would not release the JN-25 
decrypts and had refused to allow its intelligence officers to testify at the Congressional 
hearings.29
Rusbridger and Nave also believed but could not prove that the United States Navy 
intercepted the same messages and decoded them. They pointed to four primary sources 
that revealed that some JN-25 messages were read between June, 1939 and Pearl Harbor. 
However, in their search for these messages, they were told by the U.S. Naval Security 
Group that the messages could not be located. The authors argued that the Navy had 
decoded Yamamoto's commands to the fleet but concealed the information after Pearl 
Harbor after realizing that they had failed to correctly interpret the information.
Rusbridger and Nave blamed Admiral Richmond Turner for not getting the information to 
the President and for orchestrating the cover-up.30
After the publication of Betrayal at Pearl Harbor in 1991, more information surfaced 
that gave support to the allegations in the book. In the preface of the second edition in 
1992, Rusbridger and Nave noted that the wife of Commander Malcolm Burnett of the 
British Navy, insisted that her husband had personally advised Churchill that the Japanese 
force was heading toward Pearl Harbor.31 They also wrote that on December 8, 1991 the 
National Security Agency admitted for the first time that both British and American 
codebreakers had broken the JN-25 code prior to Pearl Harbor.32 The New York Times 
reported in August of 1991 that the British Ministry o f Defense had tried to convince 
Nave not to cooperate with Rusbridger and put pressure on the publishers.33
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More Debate About Admiral Kimmel
One subject that Rusbridger and Nave did not cover was the responsibilities of the 
Hawaiian commanders, but others continued this aspect o f the debate. As in the 1940's 
and 1950's, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel continued to be part of the controversy in the 
1980's and 1990's. Admiral Layton for years buried his anger over what he felt was an 
injustice done to Admiral Kimmel. With the release of top secret documents from the 
National Archives, he decided to tell his side o f the story. Exonerating Kimmel, Layton 
placed the blame on "internal feuding in the Naval Department that limited Washington's 
ability to evaluate and disseminate intelligence."34 In particular, Layton blamed Admiral 
Richmond K. Turner for taking over the responsibility of disseminating intelligence and 
then not getting the information to Kimmel. Vice Admiral David C. Richardson 
supported this assessment, denouncing the turf battle between the Naval Intelligence, 
Naval Communications and Naval War Plans Divisions over the responsibility to distribute 
intelligence.35
Henry Clausen's book, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement, charged Turner with 
culpability but also attributed liability to Kimmel and Layton as well. Clausen conducted 
the Clausen Investigation during World War II. Henry Stimson assigned him to further 
investigate the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Clausen traveled around 
the world interviewing 92 people.36 His 1992 book put the chief blame on Kimmel and 
General Short for failing to provide each other with information and to prepare Pearl 
Harbor for attack.37 He derided Layton for not informing the Army of the war warning. 
He also charged Turner with causing problems by trying to take over the Navy 
Department and insisting on interpreting the intellingence.38
The main point of Final Judgement was not assessing individual blame but to look at 
what Clausen considered the real problem. He insisted that the reason for Pearl Harbor 
was that the system failed. Describing the problems of split commands, lack of integration 
of the intelligence services, lack of understanding of the importance of intelligence and
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lack of communication, he argued that the main lesson of Pearl Harbor was that the 
system needed to be fixed, so that individuals would not fail as easily.39
Edward L. Beach, in Scapegoats: A Defense o f Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor, 
directed the blame back to the administration. Beach labeled himself a "second-class 
revisionist" in the book, meaning that he believed that Roosevelt wanted to get the United 
States into the war, but did not believe that Roosevelt had knowledge of the Japanese 
intentions to bomb Pearl Harbor. Beach claimed, without proof, that Roosevelt met with 
his chief advisors on the eve of the attack. He asserted that Roosevelt and his advisors 
guessed that there would be an attack, but underestimated the capability of the Japanese 
and did not realize that the attack would come at Pearl Harbor. Beach blamed Roosevelt 
for failing to correctly interpret the information and then using Kimmel and Short as 
scapegoats to cover up the mistakes made in Washington. Beach did not claim that there 
was a major conspiracy, only that mistakes were made and the wrong people were blamed 
for those mistakes.
Overconfidence
Many other writers of the past decade focused on broader explanations for the Pearl 
Harbor disaster. Like Beach, many argued that overconfidence and mistakes caused the 
debacle. Major Claude Sasso wrote in 1983 that the overconfidence of U.S. military and 
civilian authorities in both Pearl Harbor and Washington led them to underestimate the 
Japanese capabilities. This in turn allowed them to miss the warnings they had.40 
Thurston Clark's 1991 book Pearl Harbor Ghosts: A Journey to Pearl Harbor Then and  
Now expanded on this issue. He cited reports in newspapers that called the U.S. Navy the 
greatest in the world, speeches in Congress portraying America's superiority over Japan 
and jingoist accounts of Hawaii's impregnability. According to Clark, the prevailing 
attitude at the time was that a Japanese attack on Hawaii was a big joke.41 Weintraub
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reported that Kimmel told a newspaper reporter on December 6, that the Japanese would 
not risk a war with the United States.42
Another piece in Pearl Harbor Papers revealed that the Japanese may have suffered 
from the same problem. This was essay written after the war by Musutaka Chihaya in 
which he critized the plan to attack Hawaii. He blamed the Japanese for overestimating 
their abilities as fighters and convincing themselves that Americans were weak and lazy.43 
He criticized the Japanese Army for not studying the American Army and denounced the 
Japanese Navy for imagining it could win the war in one decisive victory.44 He argued 
that if the Japanese had not held this false confidence and had actually studied America, 
they would have avoided war.
Seth Feldman combined both the American and Japanese faults in a 1992 article. 
Feldman accused each side of being racially motivated. He argued that because of racial 
stereotypes, the two adversaries did not understand each other. The belief o f both sides in 
their own superiority hampered negotiations. Feldman extended his point to the nineties, 
arguing that both sides continued to misread each other, which allowed for the danger of a 
misunderstanding.45
Conclusion
As happened in earlier decades the controversy flourished in the 1980’s and 1990's, 
because new information evoked support, challenges and doubts. Toland, Rusbridger 
and Nave took the same basic approach as previous revisionists did. They combined 
witnesses, questions about missing evidence and titillating explanations of what might 
have occurred to create a believable argument. Other writers challenged much of Toland's 
argument and successfully attacked his evidence but only by studying it extensively and 
bringing forth more information. Rusbridger and Nave's assertions were more difficult to 
discredit. They made a convincing claim that the evidence to support their argument
was either destroyed by the British and American governments or kept classified. They 
created doubt about the official statements. Rusbridger and Nave could not prove their 
theory without the information; yet, as long as people believe that either the evidence may 
exist or may have existed, their theory will not be totally discredited.
One interesting facet of the controversy in recent years was the absence of political 
motives. Historians, political scientists, former intelligence officers, and others debated 
the topic. Congress had other scandals to investigate. Even those who supported 
conspiracy theories did so without the larger implications of an attack on interventionism. 
The politics were gone. The fight continued because the history had not been resolved.
The most important effect of the renewal o f the Pearl Harbor debate over the past 
twelve years was that it allowed for more information and a better understanding of what 
happened. The accusations and counter charges extended the interest in the event. This 
provoked the participants to come forth and tell their stories and the researchers to delve 
deeper and write more books and articles. Although writers in the eighties and nineties 
did not produce a work that closed the debate once and for all, they did provide a better 
understanding of what happened before and during the attack on Pearl Harbor. From the 
American side to the Japanese side, from Washington to Hawaii, from the covert to the 
overt, recent works revealed that there was still more to tell.
CONCLUSION
Without the doubters; the revisionists, the isolationists, the Congressional Republicans, 
those pushing agendas and those seeking the truth; without the challenges to the official 
record of what happened at Pearl Harbor, there would not have been a controversy.
These people made the charges that forced further investigation either in defense of the 
administration or in the attempt to prove various revisionist arguments. In the immediate 
aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the American people rallied behind the President. 
Those who did not believe or support the President were seen as disloyal; yet, some 
continued to doubt and to search. The critics pursued the story, pushing for more 
Information about what had happened. Their actions resulted in various official 
investigations, the release of more data and reams of sometimes questionable testimony. 
The doubts were supposed to end with the conclusions of the Congressional Investigation, 
but post-war revisionists and more recent writers have maintained their questions and the 
pressure to "uncover" the "true" story. They have succeeded not in answering the 
questions but in fostering a controversy that may never be settled. Although there has 
never been closure to the debate, the controversy has resulted in a plethora of information 
about which opinions can be made.
The heart o f the revisionist argument was that Roosevelt wanted war with Japan. In 
the least, the revisionists showed that Roosevelt did not do everything within his power to 
avoid war with Japan. Members of the administration explained at various times that the 
administration had wanted to refrain from conflict with Japan and the possibility of a 
two front war. However, it seems likely that the desire to get into the war with Germany 
outweighed this. Roosevelt had been helping the British by trading destroyers for bases,
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lend-lease and support for the convoys, but the British needed more assistance.
Roosevelt, hampered by his campaign promise to keep America out of "foreign wars," 
could not initiate the war with Germany but wanted to get into it.
Morgenstem claimed that Roosevelt wanted to the get America into the war for 
egocentric motives: a place in history and control over the nation. Although this criticism 
was unfounded, Roosevelt's actions showed that he did want war with Germany. In the 
fall o f 1941, the Navy was pushing a confrontation with the Germans, but Hitler refused to 
take the bait. Another way to become involved was through a war with Japan. In the 
summer and fall o f 1941, the option of war with Japan, Germany's ally, was certainly 
becoming more likely. The United States cut off oil to Japan and demanded a cessation of 
Japanese aggression. The pressure mounted into late November of 1941. Due to British 
secrecy, it is still unknown what Churchill told Roosevelt in his November 25th note. 
Perhaps he put more pressure on Roosevelt to enter the war. The following day 
Roosevelt rejected the "modus viviendi" and had Cordell Hull present the plan that 
the Japanese would later call an ultimatum. Many have argued that it was not an 
ultimatum, but Roosevelt's diplomacy called for Japan to make concessions it was unlikely 
to make. Roosevelt did not start the war with Japan; however, his insistence on the hard 
line in the face of Japanese goals provided little hope for a diplomatic resolution to the 
problem. By late November, 1941 the administration certainly knew that war with Japan 
was imminent, and it waited for Japan to make a move
Roosevelt had to know that war was coming. However, the real controversy is 
whether or not he knew the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor and allowed it to happen 
or possibly manipulated events to make sure that it happened. Critics claimed that 
Roosevelt set up the fleet as a target, knew the Japanese were going to attack it and knew 
the location of the attacking force. They claimed that he kept the Hawaiian commanders 
from preparing for the attack in order to achieve the devastation necessary to shock the 
nation into the war. Despite tremendous efforts, these allegations were never proven.
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It was ridiculous to assume that Roosevelt engineered the attack. The Japanese 
planned the operation for close to a year. Roosevelt wanted war and refused to appease 
Japanese aggression, but he was incapable of manipulating Japanese plans. He also did 
not know the details of these plans.
On the morning of December 7th, Roosevelt and his advisors did suspect that the 
Japanese were, in the words of Henry Stimson, "up to some devilry." They knew of 
Japan's negative and caustic reply to their proposal and when its reply would be delivered 
to the American government. They also knew the Japanese were burning documents at 
their embassy in Washington and Japan's history of surprise attacks. With the "bomb plot 
messages" American intelligence even had ample information to suspect an attack on Pearl 
Harbor. However, as Roberta Wohlstetter argued, ample intelligence did not mean that 
the data had been properly analyzed and disseminated. The administration misread the 
dangers, expecting the attacks on the Philippines and Indo-China. In simple terms, the 
government was caught looking in the wrong direction.
Roosevelt's critics could not prove the accusations to the contrary. Their claims that 
Magic pinpointed the Japanese plans were wrong, regardless of what they tried to 
read into the intercepted messages with hindsight. The Japanese foreign minister, the man 
sending the messages, claimed not to have known, and it would be ridiculous to suggest 
that he was part of the conspiracy. John Toland made the best argument that the United 
States tracked the Kido Butai, but he could not prove it. Japanese documentation insisted 
that the fleet maintained its secrecy. Nobody has ever produced the supposedly 
incriminating JN-25 messages or the Winds Execute. In any case, the latter would have 
been irrelevant as American intelligence already knew, through the Japanese reply, that 
Japan had decided to break off diplomatic relations. Roosevelt did not know that the 
Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor.
Saying that Roosevelt did not know of the attack did not absolve the administration of 
any blame in the debacle. The administration made mistakes. They failed to communicate
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effectively. The President did not tell the American people or the Congress exactly what 
the situation was. This may have been good for getting involved in the war with 
Germany, but it was not honest. If  honesty is what the American people expected of their 
leaders, they were let down.
The administration was guilty of other failures of communication. The strangely 
worded war warnings o f late November and the neglect to send additional messages based 
on new information did not prove that the administration purposefully set up the disaster 
at Pearl Harbor. However, they are the administration’s fault. It failed to see to its 
obligations. The war warnings sent to Hawaii in late November were inadequate. 
Regardless of their intent, the warnings were ambiguous enough to confuse two able 
commanders. Some of the blame should fall on General Short and Admiral Kimmel who 
could have spoken more to each other and left less to assumption. At the same time, 
those who sent the messages should have acknowledged that as additional data 
accumulated and the situation grew worse, they needed to keep the field commanders 
abreast of the situation.
At least the administration should have sent another warning on the morning of the 
seventh. Admiral Stark had hours to do so. He was at fault for not acting immediately 
and alerting the Hawaiian commanders. By not being in his office on the morning of 
December 7th, at a time when intelligence demonstrated that something critical was about 
to happen, by not using the scrambler phone to call General Short, Marshall failed to get 
the warning to Hawaii on time. Whether an additional warning, received a few hours 
before the attack would have made a significant difference in the outcome was irrelevant; 
leaders in Washington could have done more to prepare the defenses but did not.
In not foreseeing the attack and effectively communicating the situation to the 
commanders in Hawaii, the administration failed. However, this was a failure of the 
administration not the actions of a conspiracy. Blame or more accurately credit for the 
success of the attack is due to the brilliance and daring of the Japanese military as well
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as its ability to maintain secrecy and carry out the operation. On the other hand, too much 
emphasis on secrecy hurt the United States. The military was so concerned with 
maintaining the secrecy of Magic that it did not effectively utilize the information which 
Magic provided. The administration also underestimated Japanese capabilities. The 
disaster at Pearl Harbor occurred because of American mistakes and Japanese success.
The administration did not initiate the disaster but it did fail to own up to its mistakes 
which did foster the ensuing controversy.
It is the controversy itself which is the main point of this work. None of the preceding 
conclusions offer any startling new evidence that will settle the controversy once and for 
all, but that is not the point. The emphasis of this paper is that, after reading through the 
reports of the official investigations, the testimonies and private papers of those involved 
and numerous works on the subject, one cannot find any proof of a conspiracy, yet the 
controversy still exists. After all the investigations and findings, the issue will not go 
away.
The controversy developed and grew because of a failure on the part of the 
administration to admit its mistakes; a need to protect precious sources of intelligence; 
politics; and the public's desire to know the truth. In not admitting its mistakes, the 
administration struggled with a common dilemma involved with secret information. 
Although rumors surfaced about the administration's prior knowledge, to preserve its 
secrets, the administration had to deny, had to lie. They could not quell the rumors with 
the truth, so the rumors grew, and the administration appeared devious. When the truth of 
the denials was revealed after the war, it only fed the fires of the administration's critics. 
Revisionists insisted there was more to be revealed and convinced many people that they 
were right.
This would continue to have an effect on the actions of future presidents and the 
public's views of their government in the post-war period. Presidents did not always tell
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Congress or the public everything. They hid behind the veil of national security secrets, 
sometimes abusing this veil. In the case of Pearl Harbor, the government had a legitimate 
reason to withhold certain information, particularly information pertaining to its code- 
breaking activities. However, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. pointed out in The Imperial 
Presidency, later presidents manipulated the secrecy system to prevent Congress from 
checking its powers in foreign affairs. Those presidents learned to use the Pearl Harbor 
example to further their agendas, but this only eroded the people's trust in the American 
government.1
Of course, politics had a large impact on the controversy. It was the Republicans in 
Congress, looking for a weakness to exploit, who kept the issue alive. In speeches 
Congressional Republicans speculated about American code-breaking activities. 
Republicans called for additional investigations and put hard questions to administration 
officials who testified. It was Owen Brewster and Homer Ferguson, Congressional 
Republicans, who clouded the report of the Joint Congressional Committee by issuing 
their own minority views. Other Republicans called for a second Congressional 
Investigation. Their motives were clear. They hoped to reveal information which would 
damage the popularity of Roosevelt and the Democrats and allow them to gain control 
over the government.
In addition to and part of the Republican-Democrat struggle, there was the struggle 
over American foreign policy. Many of the post-war revisionists hoped to utilize the 
controversy as a forum to rebuke Roosevelt's internationalist dreams and push the nation's 
course back to one of isolationism. Charles Beard, Henry Elmer Barnes and others 
formed many of the most convincing arguments about Roosevelt's "Pearl Harbor 
Conspiracy" in the efforts to change American foreign policy. They did not achieve their 
goals, but they did stimulate the controversy over Pearl Harbor.
In the post-watergate years, it was not politics that fueled the works on Pearl Harbor 
but a determination to learn the truth. If anything, distrust in the government was higher
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in recent years than ever before. This distrust in government, not the isolationist debate, 
kept the controversy alive until more information was released. New information in recent 
years gave rise to more suspicions and desire to know the truth. Ralph Briggs 
corroborated Safford's testimony three decades after the Congressional hearings.
Robert Ogg claimed that the United States had tracked the Kido Butai. Eric Nave said the 
British intercepted Yamamoto's orders to the fleet. This and other information nourished 
the dispute.
The controversy began and continues, because people believed and still believe that 
information that would prove the conspiracy theories has been withheld. Unless there is 
information proving the conspiracy in the millions of secret documents recently released 
by the Clinton administration, the controversy will continue. The lesson is clear. When 
the American government withholds information from the public and attempts to hide its 
failures, it will always remain suspect and open to charges of wrongful actions. Its name 
may never be cleared.
APPENDIX I
Key People Involved in the Pearl Harbor Controversy
The President and his Close Advisors
Franklin Roosevelt 
Cordell Hull 
Henry Stimson 
Frank Knox 
Harry Hopkins
President of the United States 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of War 
Secretary of the Navy 
President's advisor and confidant
Naval Department in Washington
Admiral Harold Stark 
Rear Admiral Richmond Turner 
Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson 
Commander Laurance Safford
Lt. Commander Alwin Kramer
Chief of Naval Operations 
Chief of Naval War Plans Division 
Chief of Naval Intelligence Div. 
Chief of Security Intelligence
Communications (OP-20-G) 
Chief Translator, OP-20-G
War Department in Washington
General George Marshall 
Brig. General Leonard Gerow 
Brig. General Sherman Miles 
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton 
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler 
William Friedman 
Ralph T. Briggs
In Hawaii
Lt. General Walter Short 
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel
Lt. Commander Edwin Layton 
Admiral J. O. Richardson
Rear Admiral Claude C.Block
Chief of Staff 
Chief, War Plans Division 
Chief of Intelligence 
Chief, Far East Intelligence 
Chief, Signals Intelligence 
Chief Cryptographer 
Senior Radio Operator, Cheltenham 
Intercept Station
Commanding General 
Commander in Chief United States 
Pacific Fleet 
Fleet Intelligence Officer 
Kimmel's Predecessor as Commander 
in Chief of Pacific Fleet 
Commander Hawaiian Naval District
79
80
Kev Japanese
Shigenori Togo 
Kichisaburo Nomura 
Saburo Kuruso 
Isoroku Yamamoto 
Minoru Genda
Foreign Minister 
Ambassador to the U.S.
Special Envoy to the U.S. 
Commander of Combined Fleet 
Developed Pearl Harbor Operational 
Plan
AttackThe Members of the Joint Congressional Committee for the 
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Senator Alben Barkley 
Rep. J. Bayard Clark 
Rep. Jere Cooper 
Senator Walter F. George 
Senator Scott W. Lucas 
Rep. John W. Murphy
Senator Owen Brewster 
Senator Homer Ferguson 
Rep. Beartrand W. Gearhart 
Rep. Frank B. Keefe
Democrat from Kentucky 
Democrat from North Carolina 
Democrat from Tennessee 
Democrat from Georgia 
Democrat from Illinois 
Democrat from Pennsylvania
Republican from Maine 
Republican from Michigan 
Republican from California 
Republican from Wisconsin
Others
Winston Churchill 
Thomas E. Dewey
James Forrestal 
Joseph Grew 
Owen Roberts
Charles Rugg 
Robert Ogg
Captain Richard McCullough 
Captain Johan E. Meijer Ranneft
British Prime Minister 
Governor of New York, Republican 
Presidential Nominee, 1944 
Secretary of the Navy after Knox 
Ambassador to Japan 
Supreme Court Justice, Head of the 
Roberts Commission 
Kimmel's attorney 
Toland’s "Seaman Z"
Ogg's Commander
Dutch naval attache in Washington
81
Key Writers Supporting a Conspiracy
Henry Elmer Barnes Charles Beard
William Henry Chamberlin John T. Flynn
Percy Greaves Admiral Husband E. Kimmel
George Morgenstem Eric Nave
James Rusbridger Charles Tansill
Admiral Robert A. Theobald John Toland
Kev Writers Opposing a Conspiracy
Henry Clausen John Costello
Alvin Coox Katherin Dillon
Herbert Feis Robert Ferrel
Donald Goldstein Admiral Edwin T. Layton
Samuel Eliot Morison Roger Pinot
Gordon Prange Basil Rauch
Stanley Weintraub Roberta Wohlstetter
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1. United States Congress, Report o f the Joint Committee on the Investigaton o f the 
Pearl Harbor Attack, Seventy-ninth Congress, (Washington, D. C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 65. (Hereafter referred to as "Report of the Joint 
Committee").
2. George Morgenstem, Pearl Harbor The Story o f the Secret War, (New York: 
William Morrow and Co., 1947), pp. 87-88.
3. James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured 
Roosevelt into World War II, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 49-55.
4. Ibid., pp. 58-61.
5. Ibid., p. 50.
6. Edwin T. Layton with Roger Pineau and John Costello, "AndI Was There ” Pearl 
Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets, (New York: William Morrow and Co.,
1985), p. 79.
7. Ibid.
8. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1962), pp. 382-384.
9. Friedman, William F. "Certain Aspects of Magic in the Cryptological Background 
in the Various Official Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Attack". The Friedman 
Crptographic Collection, Box 110, Folder 6. The George C. Marshall Library.
Lexington, Virginia.
10. Rusbridger, p. 81.
11. Friedman, p. 45.
12. United States Congress, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation 
o f the Pearl Harbor Attack, vol. 12, Seventy-ninth Congress, (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 261. (Hereafter referrred to as "Hearings").
82
83
[Notes to pages 7 -1 2 ]
13. Ibid., p. 262
14. Ibid., pp. 262-263.
15. Ibid., p. 100.
16. Ibid., p. 116.
17. Ibid., p. 165.
18. Ibid., p. 195.
19. Ibid., p. 201.
20. Ibid., pp. 209-215.
21. Ibid., pp. 239-244.
22. John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath, (Garden City, NJ: 
Doubleday and Co., inc., 1982), p. 352.
23. Hearings, vol. 12, p. 245.
24. Ibid., p. 248.
CHAPTER I
1. The New York Times, December 5, 1941, p. 5.
2. Newsweek, Vol. 18 (December 15, 1941), pp. 22-23.
3. The New York Times, December 8, 1941, p. 6 and Time, Vol. 38 (December 15,
1941), p. 19.
4. Time, vol. 38 (December 15, 1941), p. 19.
5. Martin V. Melosi, The Shadow o f Pearl Harbor, (College Station, TX: Texas A & 
M University Press, 1977), pp. 4-5.
6. Oswald Garrison Villard, "The Pearl Harbor Report", Current History, Vol. 2 
(March, 1942), p. 13
84
[Notes to pages 12 - 16]
7. Melosi, p. 12.
8. Newsweek, vol. 18 (December 15, 1941), p. 19
9. Layton, p. 325.
10. Melosi, p. 19.
11. Hadley Cantrill and Mildred Strunk, Public Opinion 1935-1946, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 1144.
12. Layton, p. 332.
13. Robert A. Theobald, The Final Secret o f Pearl Harbor The Washington 
Contribution to the Japanese Attack, (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1954), p. 
155.
14. The New York Times, January 27, 1942, p. 4 and January, 28, 1942, p. 5.
15. Villard, p. 14.
16. The New York Times, January 29, 1942, p. 4.
17. Diary of Henry L. Stimson, January 25, 1942, XXXVII, 64, Sterling Memorial 
Library, New Haven, CT.
18. The New York Times, January 27, 1942, p. 4.
19. Layton, p. 343.
20. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming o f the War, 1941. A Study in 
Appearances and Realities. (New York: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 243-245.
21. Ibid., p. 247.
22. Melosi, pp. 57-58.
23. Ibid., p. 59.
24. Ibid., pp. 60-61.
25. Arthur Krock, "Pearl Harbor Echoes", The New York 
Times, May 31, 1944, p. 8.
85
[Notes to pages 16-19]
26. Beard, pp. 257-258.
27. Ibid., pp. 262-266.
28. Melosi, pp. 72-73.
29. Beard, p. 273.
30. Ibid., p. 275.
31. The New York Times, August 22, 1944, p. 1.
32. The New York Times, August 22, 1944, p. 32.
33. The New York Times, August 26, 1944, p. 4 and
August 27, 1944, p. 6.
34. The New York Times, August 31, 1944, p. 18.
35. The New York Times, September 8, 1941, p. 11.
36. The New York Times, September 22, p. 11.
37. Melosi, pp. 76-77.
38. The New York Times, September 23, 1944, p. 8.
39. Forest C. Pogue, George Marshall: Organizer o f Victory, {New York: The
Viking Press, 1973), p. 471.
40. Statement for Record of Brig. General Carter W. Clarke, GSC, in the transmittal 
o f Letters from George C. Marshall to Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Latter Part of 
September, 1944. The Friedman Cryptographic Collection, Box 110, Folder 5. George 
C. Marshall Library, Lexington VA. (Hereafter referred to as the Clarke Statement), p. 2.
41. Ibid., p. 4.
42. Ibid., p. 7.
43. Ibid., p. 9.
44. Pogue, p. 472.
86
[Notes to pages 20 - 26]
45. Clarke Statement, p. 11.
46. Melosi, p. 86.
47. The New York Times, December 5, 1944, p. 22.
48. Time, Vol 44 (October 30, 1944), p. 16.
49. The New York Times, December 2, 1944, p. 5 and Time, Vol. 44 (December 11, 
1944), p. 22.
50. Theobald, p. 161.
51. Ibid., pp. 167-168.
52. Dr. George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1945, Vol. 1, 
(New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 528-529.
53. Report o f the Joint Committee, p. xv.
54. Time, Vol. 46 (November 12, 1945), p. 23.
55. Time, Vol. 46 (December 24, 1945), p. 25.
56. Report o f the Joint Committee, pp. 251-252.
57. Theobald, p. 170.
58. United States Congress, Minority Views o f the Joint Committee on the 
Investigation o f the Pearl Harbor Attack, Seventy-ninth Congress, (Washington, D. C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 9-11, (Hereafter referred to as 
"Minority Views").
59. "Final Report," Time, vol. 48 (July 29, 1946, p. 15.
CHAPTER II
1. Basil Rauch, Roosevelt, From Munich to Pearl Harbor,
(New York: Creative Age Press, 1950), p. 464.
87
[Notes to pages 26 - 31]
2. Henry Elmer Barnes, Perpetual War fo r  Perpetual Peace, (Caldwell Idaho: The 
Caxton Printing, Ltd., 1953), p. 6.
3. Ibid., p. 652.
4. Morgenstem, p. 95.
5. See Henry Elmer Barnes' Perpetual War fo r  Perpetual Peace, Charles Beard's 
President Roosevelt and the Coming o f the War, 1941 and Charles Tansill's Backdoor to 
War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941, (Chicago. Henry Regnery Co., 1952).
6. Frank Paul Mintz, Revisionism and the Origins o f Pearl Harbor, (New York: 
University Press o f America, 1985), p. 53.
7. The American Mercury, vol. 87 (December, 1958), pp. 13-15.
8. Theobald, p. 121.
9. Husband E. Kimmel, AdmiralKimmeVs Story, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 
1955), pp. 109-111.
10. Ibid., p. 4.
11. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs o f Cordell Hull, (New York: MacMillan, 1948), p. 
1101 .
12. Henry L. Stimson Diaries, volume 36, p. 6 (November 6th, 1941) in Sterling 
Memorial Library, New Haven Connecticut. (Hereafter referred to as "Stimson Diaries").
13. Hearings, p. 1166.
14. "Official Memorandum of Marshall News Conference of November 15, 1941" 
Sent by Robert Sherod to Forest Pogue on March 10, 1964. Xerox 3067 in the Marshall 
Archives Collection, The Marshall Library, Lexington, VA.
15. Hearings, p. 5227.
16. Stimson Diaries, vol 36, p. 53 (November 27th, 1941).
17. Ibid., vol. 36, p. 48 (November 25th, 1941).
18. Morgenstem, p. 327.
88
[Notes to pages 32-37]
19. Theobald, p. 122.
20. Kimmel, p. 114.
21. Ibid., p. 115.
22. Ibid., pp. 115-116.
23. Theobald, pp. 18-19.
24. Kimmel, pp. 116-117.
25. Morgenstem, p. 58.
26. Theobald, pp. 24-28.
27. Stimson Diaries, vol. 36, p. 48 (November 25th, 1941).
28. Ibid., vol. 36, p. 50 (November, 26th, 1941).
29. Hull, pp. 1081-1084.
30. George Morgenstem, "The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor" in Perpetual War fo r  
Perpetual Peace, edited by Henry Elmer Barnes, (Caldwell Idaho: The Caxton Printing, 
Ltd., 1953), p. 346.
31. Barnes, p. 643.
32. Toland, p. 252.
33. Ibid., p. 253.
34. Bames, p. 646.
35. Morgenstem, "The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor," pp.349-359.
36. Kimmel, pp. 86-87.
37. "Remarks o f the President on the Occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 
8:30 and continuing at 9:00 with legislative leaders on 12/7/41," Found in The Roosevelt 
Official Files, #4675, The Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, p. 2.
38. Stimson Diaries, vol. 36, p. 81 (December 7th, 1941).
89
[Notes to pages 37 - 42]
39. Hull, pp. 1098-1099.
40. Hearings, p. 2268.
41. Ibid., p. 2149.
42. Ibid., p. 1277.
43. Ibid., p. 2174.
44. Ibid., p. 1152.
45. Ibid., volume 12.
46. "Certain Aspects o f Magic in the Cryptological Background in the Various Official 
Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Attack," pp. 59-60.
47. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
48. Hearings, p. 2125 and Gordon W. Prange with Donald M. Goldstein and 
Katherine Dillon, Pearl Harbor: The Verdict o f History, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., 1950).
49. Hearings, pp. 2125-2133.
50. Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study o f the Life and Times o f  
Henry L. Stimson, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 531.
51. Report o f the Joint Committee, pp. 110 and 119.
52. Kimmel, p. 45.
53. Ibid., p. 48.
54. M inority Views, p. 43.
55. Theobald, p. 87.
56. Ibid., p. 26.
57. Morgenstem, p. 269.
90
[Notes to pages 42 - 45]
58. For the accusations of the Conspiracists, see Morgenstem, Pearl Harbor: The 
Story o f the Secret War and Theobald, The Final Secret o f Pearl Harbor. For the 
testimonies of Marshall and Stark, see Hearings.
59. Hearings, part 11, pp. 5556-5557.
60. Ibid., part 11, p. 5545.
61. Ibid., part 10, pp. 4111-4112 and 4623.
62. See Marshall Testimony in Hearings.
63. "Memo for General W. B. Smith, January 8, 1942 from J. R. Deane (Secretary, 
General Staff)," Found in Box 70, File 19 of the Marshall Files, Marshall Library, 
Lexington, V.A.
64. Hearings, p. 2184.
65. "Testimony of George C. Marshall at the Army Pearl Harbor Board," Box 70, File 
21, pp. 13-14 and "Testimony of George C. Marshall to the Pearl Harbor Court of
Inquiry," Box 70, File 22, p. 863, Marshall Files, Marshall Library, Lexington, V. A.
66. "Testimony of Lt. Colonel Edward F. French," Box 70, File 21, pp. 3-4, Marshall 
Files, Marshall Library, Lexington, V. A.
67. "George C. Marshall before the Roberts' Commission," Box 70, File 21, pp. 1801- 
1802, Marshall Files, Marshall Library, Lexington, V. A.
68. Morgenstem, p. 267.
69. The New York Times, September 12, 1963, p. 10.
70. Hearings, part 12, p. 154.
71. Ibid., part 8, pp. 3579, 3586-3588.
72. Report o f the Joint Committee, p. 472.
73. Hearings, part 8, pp. 3909, 3913 and part 9, p. 3931.
74. Ibid., part 9, p. 4545 and part 10, p. 4629.
75. Ibid., part 9, p. 4509.
91
[Notes to pages 46-51]
76. "Letter from Frank B. Rowlett to John Toland," Box 1, File 16, The Friedman 
Collection, The Marshall Library, Lexington, V.A. and "Certain Aspects of Magic in the 
Cryptological Background in the Various Official Investigations of the Pearl Harbor 
Attack," p. 57.
77. Hearings, part 34, pp. 306-307.
78. This was found in notes scribbled by William Friedman on an autographed copy of 
Safford's statement regarding the Winds Message before the Joint Committee, August 14, 
1941, File 34, The Friedman Collection, The Marshall Library, Lexington, V.A.
79. Percy L. Greaves, "The Pearl Harbor Investigations" in Perpetual War fo r  
Perpetual Peace, edited by Henry Elmer Barnes, (Caldwell Idaho: The Caxton Printing, 
Ltd., 1953), p. 442.
80. "The Road to Pearl Harbor," p. 350.
81. Report o f the Joint Committee, p. 486.
CHAPTER III
1. Samuel Eliot Morison, History o f the United States Naval Operations in World 
War Two, Vol. Ill, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1973), pp. 127-129.
2. Seth Richardson, "Why Were We Caught Napping at Pearl Harbor?" Saturday 
Evening Post, Vol.219, No. 47 (May 24, 1947), pp. 76-80.
3. Samuel Eliot Morison, By Land and By Sea: Essays and Addresses, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 332.
4. Robert H. Ferrell, "Pearl Harbor and the Revisionists," The Historian, Vol. 55, No. 
2, (Spring, 1955), p. 233-234.
5. Hans L. Trefouse, What Happened at Pearl Harbor?, (New York. Twayne 
Publishers, 1958), p. 18.
6. Rauch, p. viii.
7. Ibid., p. 1.
8. Ibid., p. 464.
92
[Notes to pages 51 - 55]
9. Ibid., p. 466.
10. Herbert Feis, "Fifteen Years of Hindsight Justify F.D.R.," The Washington Post, 
December 2nd, 1956, p. 384.
11. Ibid., p. 399.
12. Harley Cope, "Climb Mount Niitaka," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 
Vol. 72, No. 12, (December, 1946), p. 1517.
13. Robert Ward, "The Inside Story of the Pearl Harbor Plan," United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 77, No. 12, (December, 1956), pp. 1272-1277.
14. Ibid., pp. 1279, 1282.
15. Shigenori Togo, "Why Japan Attacked Pearl Harbor," U.S. News and World 
Report, Vol. 42, No. 9 (August 31, 1956), p. 137.
16. Ibid., p. 138.
17. Perpetual War fo r  Perpetual Peace, pp. 23, 26, 44.
18. Mintz, p. 51.
19. Cabell Philips, "Ten Years Ago This Friday," The New York Times, December 
2nd, 1951, Part vi, p. 9.
20. "Marshall, Stark Reply on 41 Plan," The New York Times, April 18, 1954, p. 31.
21. Perpetual War fo r  Perpetual Peace, p. 61.
22. Ibid., pp. 55, 66.
23. Ibid., p. 74.
24. Ladislas Farago, "Why Forewarned Was Not Forearmed," The New York Times, 
September 16, 1962, p. 7.
25. Wohlstetter, p. 213.
26. Ibid., p. 244.
27. Ibid., p. 392.
93
[Notest to pages 55 - 62]
28. Ibid., p. 395.
29. Ibid., p. 401.
30. Mintz, p. 59.
31. Ibid., p. 66.
32. Henry Elmer Barnes, "Secretary Knox and Pearl Harbor," The National Review, 
Vol. 18, No. 50, (December 13, 1966), p. 1260.
33. Henry Elmer Barnes, Pearl Harbor A fter a Quarter o f a Century, (New York: 
Amo Press and New York Times, 1972), p. 28.
34. Ibid., p. 45.
35. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
36. Ibid., p. 93.
37. Ibid., p. 37.
38. Ibid., pp. 83-84.
39. Ibid., pp. 85-87.
CHAPTER IV
1. Perpetual War fo r  Perpetual Peace, p. 57.
2. Toland, pp. xv-xvi.
3. Ibid., p. 320.
4. Stanley Weintraub, Long Day's Journey Into War, December 7th, 1941, (New 
York: Truman Talley Books, 1991), p. 196.
5. Ibid., p. 300.
6. Toland, pp. 195-198.
7. "Interview with Mr. Ralph T. Briggs," found in Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, New York, pp. 1-5.
94
[Notes to pages 62 - 65]
8. Ibid., pp. 6, 10-11.
9. Ibid., p. 8.
10. Ibid., p. 16.
11. Layton, p. 523.
12. Robert William Low, Jr., Review of Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath by 
John Toland in United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 100, No. 119,
(September, 1982), p. 97.
13. Weintraub, p . 101.
14. "Sailor in Pearl Harbor Warning is Identified," The New York Times, December 
4th, 1983, p.25.
15. Telford Taylor, "Day of Infamy, Decades of Doubt," The New York Times, April 
29th, 1984, p. 114.
16. Ibid., p. 120.
17. Alvin Coox, "Repulsing the Pearl Harbor Revisionists: The State of Present 
Literature on the Debate," M ilitary Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, (January, 1986), p. 30.
18. Weintraub, p. 102.
19. Gordon W. Prange with Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, Pearl Harbor: 
The Verdict o f History, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1986), pp. 55-56.
20. "Submarine Operations, Extracts, December 1941-April, 1942," p. 273 and 
"Conquer the Pacific Aboard Destroyer Akigumo," p. 207 in Donald Goldstein and 
Katherine Dillon, Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, (New York:
Brassey's, 1993).
21. "Japanese Study of the Pearl Harbor Operations" in Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside 
the Japanese Plans, pp. 282-283.
22. Ibid., p. 296.
23. Minoru Genda, "How the Japanese Task Force Idea Materialized" in Pearl Harbor 
Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, p. 11.
95
[Notes to pages 65 -70]
24. Minoru Genda, "Analysis No. 1 of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Operation Al" in 
Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, p. 30.
25. Rusbridger and Nave, p. 88.
26. Ibid., p. 139.
27. Ibid., p. 147.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 142.
30. Ibid., p. 179.
31. James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill 
Lured Roosevelt into World War II, 2nd edition, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 
p. 5.
32. Ibid., p. 7.
33. "Did Churchill Know?" The New York Times, August 7th, 1991, p. c4.
34. Layton, p. 512.
35. Vice Admiral David Richardson, "You Decide," United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings, Vol. 117, No. 12, (December, 1991), p. 35.
36. Greaves, p. 434.
37. Henry Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement, (New York: 
Crown Publishers, 1992), pp. 300-301.
38. Ibid., pp. 303-305.
39. Ibid., pp. 292-297.
40. Major Claud Sasso, "Scapegoats or Culprits: Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor," 
M ilitary Review, Vol. 63, No. 12, (December, 1983), p. 45.
41. Thurston Clark, Pearl Harbor Ghosts: A Journey to Hawaii Then and Now,
(New York: William Morrow and Company, inc., 1991), pp. 111-116.
96
[Notes to pages 70 - 78]
42. Weintraub, p. 69.
43. Musutaka Chihaya, "An Intimate Look at the Japanese Navy" in Pearl Harbor 
Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, pp. 320-323.
44. Ibid, pp. 328-331.
45. Seth Feldman, "The Failure o f Intelligence Fifty Years After Pearl Harbor," 
Queen's Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 1, (Spring, 1992), pp. 25-31.
CONCLUSION
249. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 
Co., 1973), p. 358.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Archival Materials
Hyde Park, New York. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Papers, Official Files.
________ . Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's Files.
________ . Harry Hopkins Papers.
________ . Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Collection.
Lexington, Virginia. George C. Marshall Library. George C. Marshall Papers.
________ . George C. Marshall Personal Files.
________ . National Archives Collection.
________ . William F. Friedman Cryptologic Collection.
New Haven Connecticut. Sterling Memorial Library, Manuscripts and Archives. Henry 
L. Stimson Diaries.
________ . Henry L. Stimson Papers (Microfilm edition).
Government Documents
United States Congress Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation o f the 
Pearl Harbor Attack, Seventy-ninth Congress, 39 volumes. Washington, D. C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1946.
________ . M inority Views o f the Joint Committee on the Investigation o f the Pearl
Harbor Attack, Seventy-ninth Congress. Washington, D C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1946.
________ . Report o f the Joint Committee on the Investigation o f the Pearl Harbor
Attack, Seventy-ninth Congress. Washington, D C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1946.
97
98
Newspapers and Periodicals
American Heritage 
The American Mercury 
The Boston Globe 
Colliers 
Commonweal 
Current History 
Encounter 
Forum
The Historian
Life
Nation
The National Review
The New Republic
Newsweek
The New York Times
The Saturday Evening Post
Time
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 
U. S. News and World Report 
The Washington Post
99
Books
Albright, Henry. Japan's Fatal Blunder The True Story Behind Japan's Attack on 
December 7th, 1941. New York: Hippocrane Books, 1988.
Barnes, Henry Elmer. The Chickens o f the Isolationist Liberals Have Come Home to 
Roost. New York: The Revisionist Press, 1973.
________ . Pearl Harbor After a Quarter o f a Century. New York: Amo Press and
New York Times, 1972.
________ . Perpetual War fo r  Perpetual Peace. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers,
Ltd., 1953.
Barnet, Richard J. The Rockets Red Glare: When America Goes to War, the Presidents 
and the People. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.
________ . Roots o f War. New York: Athenum, 1972.
Beach, Edward L. Scapegoats: A Defense o f Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor. 
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
Beard, Charles. President Roosevelt and the Coming o f War, 1941, A Study in 
Appearances and Realities. New York: Yale University Press, 1948.
Borg, Dorothy and Shumpei Okamoto, eds. Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-
American Relations, 1931-1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.
Brownlow, Donald Grey. The Accused The Ordeal o f Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, U. S. N. New York: Vintage Press, 1968.
Cantrill, Hadley and Strunk, Mildred. Public Opinion 1935-1946. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1951.
Clark, Ronald. The Man Who Broke Purple: The Life o f Colonel William F. Friedman 
who Deciphered the Japanese Code in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1977.
Clark, Thurston. Pearl Harbor Ghosts. A Journey to Hawaii Then and Now. New York: 
William Morrow and Company, inc., 1991.
100
Clausen, Henry C. and Lee, Bruce. Pearl Harbor Final Judgement. New York: Crown 
Publishers, 1992.
Conroy, Hilary and Wray, Harry, eds. Pearl Harbor Reexamined Prologue to the Pacific 
War. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990.
Davis, Forrest and Lindley, Ernest K. How War Came An American White Paper: From 
the Fall o f France to Pearl Harbor. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942.
Flynn, John T. The Truth About Pearl Harbor. New York: Privately printed pamphlet, 
1944. (Found in Lexington, Virginia. George C. Marshall Library. George C. 
Marshall Personal File, Xerox 2110.)
Gallup, Dr. George H. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, Vol. 1. New 
York: Random House, 1972.
Goldstein, Donald M. and Dillon, Katherine V. Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese 
Plans. New York: Brassey's, 1993.
Grew, Joseph. Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record o f Forty Years, 1904-1945, Part II. 
Walter Johnson, ed. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1952.
Higham, John. Writing American History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970.
Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs o f Cordell Hull. New York: Macmillan, 1948.
Iriye, Akira. The Origins o f the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific. New York. 
Longman, 1987.
Kimmel, Husband E. Admiral Kimmel's Story. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955.
Layton, Edwin T. with Pineau, Roger and Costello, John. "And I  was There" Pearl 
Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets. New York: William Morrow and 
Co., 1985.
LaFault, Robert and Morello, Ronald. Remembering Pearl Harbor. Wilmington: SR 
Books, 1984.
Lafeber, Walter. The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 
Since 1750. New York. Wilson Norton and Company, 1989.
Melosi, Martin V. The Shadow o f Pearl Harbor. College Station, Texas: Texas A & M 
University Press, 1977.
101
Mintz, Frank Paul. Revisionism and the Origins o f Pearl Harbor. New York: University 
Press of America, 1985.
Morgenstern, George. Pearl Harbor The Story o f the Secret War. New York: The 
Devin-Adair Co., 1947.
Morison, Elting E. Turmoil and Tradition: A Study o f the Life and Times o f Henry L. 
Stimson. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1960.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. By Land and By Sea: Essays and Addresses. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1953.
________ . History o f the United States Naval Operations in World War Two, Vol. Ill,
The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April, 1942. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1948.
Pogue, Forest C. George Marshall: Organizer o f Victory. New York: The Viking Press, 
1973.
Prange, Gordon W. with Goldstein, Donald M. and Dillon, Katherine V. Pearl Harbor: 
The Verdict o f History. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1986.
Rauch, Basil. Roosevelt, From Munich to Pearl Harbor. New York: Creative Age Press, 
1950.
Rusbridger, James and Nave, Eric. Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured 
Roosevelt into World War II. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.
Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.
Tansill, Charles. Backdoor to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941. Chicago: 
Henry Regnery, Co., 1952.
Theobald, Robert A. The Final Secret o f Pearl Harbor The Washington Contribution to 
the Japanese Attack. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1954.
Tolland, John. Infamy. Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath. Garden City, NY: Doubleday 
and Co., inc, 1982.
Trefousse, Hans L. What Happened at Pearl Harbor? New York: Twayne Publishers, 
1958.
Waller, George M., ed. Pearl Harbor Roosevelt and the Coming o f the War. Lexington, 
MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1976.
102
Weintraub, Stanley. Long Day's Journey into War, December 7th, 1941. New York: 
Truman Tally Books, 1991.
Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1962.
Articles
Barnes, Henry Elmer, "Secretary Knox and Pearl Harbor," National Review, Vol. 18, No. 
50, (December, 13, 1966), p. 1260.
Beach, Captain Edward L., "Who's to Blame?" United States Naval Academy 
Proceedings, Vol. 117, No. 12, (December, 1991), pp. 37-40.
Beatty, Vice Admiral Frank E., "The Background of the Secret Paper," National Review, 
Vol. 18, No. 50, (December, 13, 1966), pp. 1261-1266.
Coox, Alvin D., "Repulsing the Pearl Harbor Revisionism: The State of Present Literature 
on the Debate," M ilitary Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, (January, 1986), pp. 29-31.
Cope, Harley, "Climb Mount Niitaka," United States Naval Academy Proceedings, Vol. 
72, No. 12, (December, 1946), pp. 1515-1519.
Feis, Herbert, "Fifteen Years of Hindsight Justify F.D.R.," The Washington Post, 
December 2nd, 1956.
________ , "War Came at Pearl Harbor: Suspicions Considered," Yale Review, Vol. 45,
No. 3, (Spring, 1956), pp. 378-390.
Feldman, Seth, "The Failure o f Intelligence Fifty Years After Pearl Harbor," Queen's 
Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 1, (Spring, 1992), pp. 20-32.
Ferrell, Robert H., "Pearl Harbor and the Revisionists," The Historian, Vol. 62, No. 2, 
(Spring, 1955), pp. 215-233.
Greaves, Percy, "Pearl Harbor," National Review, Vol. 18, No. 50, (December, 13, 1966), 
pp. 1267-1272.
Lafeber, Walter, "The Constitution and U.S. Foreign Policy: An interpretation," Journal 
o f American History, Vol. 74, No. 3, (December, 1987), pp. 695-717.
Marks, Frederick W., "Facade and Failure: The Hull-Nomura Talks of 1941,"
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, (Winter, 1985), pp. 99-112.
"New Book Challenges Old Myths". The Washington Post. December 7th, 1993.
103
Richardson, David C. "You Decide," United States Naval Academy Proceedings, Vol. 
117, No. 12 (December, 1991), pp. 34-39.
Richardson, Seth, "Why Were We Caught Napping at Pearl Harbor?" Saturday Evening 
Post, Vol. 219, No. 47, (May 24, 1947), pp. 20-21, 76-80.
Rusbridger, James, "Mythology and Fact about Enigma and Pearl Harbor," Encounter, 
Vol. 66, No. 1, (January, 1986), pp. 6-13.
Sasso, Major Claude R., "Scapegoats or Culprits: Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor," 
M ilitary Review, Vol. 63, No. 12, (December, 1983), pp. 28-47.
Togo, Shigenori, "Why Japan Attacked Pearl Harbor, U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 
41, No. 9, (August 31, 1956), pp. 122-151.
Villard, Oswald Garrison. "The Pearl Harbor Report", Current History vol. 2 (March,
1942): 13-15.
Ward, Robert, "The Inside Story of the Pearl Harbor Plan," United States Naval 
Academy Proceedings, Vol. 77, No. 12, (December, 1951), pp. 1271-1283.
VITA
Robert Seifert Hamblet
Bom in Lawrence, Massachusetts, April 7, 1967. Graduated from Salem High School 
in Salem, New Hampshire, June 1985., B.S. in Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 
1989. Middle school history teacher, Our Lady of Mercy School, Potomac, Maryland,
1989-1993. Swim Coach, Georgetown University, 1989-1993.
In August 1993, the author entered the College of William and Mary as a graduate 
student in the Department of History. He is presently teaching eighth grade history at 
The Potomac School in McLean, Virginia.
